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THE ADMINISTRATION OF SUCCESSIONS:
ANGLO-AMERICAN INFLUENCE UPON
LOUISIANA LAW*
Sidney Pugh Ingram**
Let's choose executors, and talk of wills.
Richard II, IlI, 2
istory is not a reliable means by which to predict the future,Hbut it is the most nearly reliable that man, in his frailty,
possesses. An understanding of the law of successions that is
applied in an age produces a clearer perception of the nature of
an age. And the nature of an age is a key to its events. This
paper treats the changes that took place in that part of the Lou-
isiana law of successions that affects their administration, under
the influence of the Anglo-American law regulating the admin-
istration of estates.
The Louisiana law was civilian at its beginning because the
policy of the mother countries, France and Spain, required that
it be. It became susceptible to the influence of the Anglo-Amer-
ican law because of Louisiana's geographical and political rela-
tion to the former British colonies to the east.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL FORCES IN LOUISIANA
Louisiana was established as a French colony in 1699.1 The
French Crown, in 1712, granted the colony to Antoine Crozat
under a charter providing that the colonial judiciary was, in
civil suits, to apply the Custom of Paris, a written compilation
of customary law that contained both Roman and Germanic ele-
ments. In 1717, Crozat surrendered his charter. The colony was
granted to John Law's Company of the West with the require-
ment that the judiciary continue to apply the Custom of Paris. 2
*Appreciation is expressed to Mr. Neill H. Alford, Jr., and to Mr. Kenneth
R. Redden of the Law Faculty of the University of Virginia, to Mr. George W.
Pugh of the Law Faculty of Louisiana State University, and to Mr. H. Minor
Pipes, Attorney at Law, Houma, Louisiana, for their assistance in the prepara-
tion of this paper. This paper is adapted from a thesis submitted and approved
for the degree of Master of Laws conferred upon the author on June 3, 1963,
by the General Faculty of the University of Virginia.
**Attorney at Law, New Orleans, Louisiana.
1. See 1 FORTIER, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 35-46 (1904) [hereinafter cited
as FORTIER].
2. See McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1
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In 1732, the company failed and Louisiana became a French
crown colony, the Custom of Paris remaining in force.8
France secretly ceded Louisiana to Spain in 1762 by the
Treaty of Fontainebleau. Four years later Ulloa, the first Span-
ish governor, arrived in New Orleans to assume possession of
the colony in the name of Spain. The population, being of
French ancestry, expelled Ulloa and established an independent
government. Supported by Spanish troops, O'Reilly, the suc-
ceeding Spanish governor, landed in the colony in 1769 and put
down the insurrection. 4 A proclamation was issued that declared
the Custom of Paris abolished. 5 A code of Spanish law, supple-
mented by "instructions" prepared by two lawyers on O'Reilly's
staff, was substituted. 6
In 1800, Louisiana was secretly ceded to France by the
Treaty of San Ildefonso, but France did not take possession im-
mediately.7 After selling Louisiana to the United States, France
under Laussat8 took possession of the former colony for a period
of three weeks before surrendering possession to the United
States on December 20, 1803. 9 No attempt was made to reestab-
lish the French law in this brief period. I'
The next year, the United States Congress divided the land
purchased into two separate political entities, the District of
Louisiana (containing the land north of the thirty-third paral-
lel) and the Territory of Orleans (containing the land south of
the thirty-third parallel)."
At the end of the Spanish colonial period, the land within
the boundaries of the Territory of Orleans (which was later
established)i contained a population of 50,000. Settlement was
(1960) [hereinafter cited as McMahon]. The first serious case to arise in the
Colony after its capital had become fixed at New Orleans was Ceard v. Chauvin
Freres (1724). See Dart, Ceard's Case (1724), 5 LA. HIST. Q. 155 (1922).
3. See McMahon, at 1.
4. See 1.FoRnIER, at 159-212.
5. See McMahon, at 1.
6. See CROsS, SuccEsSIoNs xxiii (1891). It is generally thought that the
Code and "instructions" were derived from the Recopilacion de las Indias and the
Recopilacion de Castilla, which, in turn, contained references to the Codigo de
las Siete Partidas, the Nueva Recopilacion de las Leyes de Espana, the Puero
Real, and the Forum Juzgo. See McMahon, at 1.
7. See McMahon, at 1.
8. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE at xiv (Dainow ed. 1947).
9. See McMahon, at 1.
10. Ibid.
11. See 3 FoRTan, at 12.
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concentrated in the southeast,12 the lower part of the Missis-
sippi River's delta where there were many large sugar planta-
tions tilled by Negro slaves.13 New Orleans, a center of trade
for the American frontiersmen of Tennessee, Kentucky, and
the Northwest Territory, as well as for the Louisiana planters, 4
had a population of 10,000.1" The north and west, with the ex-
ception of a narrow strip of alluvial lowland lying near the Red
River, were thinly settled.' 6 Distinctions in wealth were great. 7
The free population was predominantly French in language and
ancestry.'
The sugar planters often found it necessary to obtain loans
or advancements from the merchants of New Orleans to culti-
vate their crops and to prepare them for the market. In 1803,
the New Orleans merchants held mortgages on most of the plan-
tations.' 9
Louisianians of all classes 2° were in sympathy with the prin-
ciples of the French Revolution. 2' When, in 1793, news was re-
ceived of the execution of Louis XVI, there was great rejoic-
ing.22 Activity was not confined to the expression of sentiment.
Many prominent men of the colony engaged in various open and
12. See 2 FORTIER, at 213.
13. See DAVIS, LOUISIANA, THE PELICAN STATE 122 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS]; 1 LOUISIANA UNDER THE RULE OF SPAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1785-1807, at 119-23 (Robertson ed., 1911).
14. See STANDARD HISTORY OF NEW ORLEANS 545 (Rightor ed. 1900). More
than half of the export of New Orleans came from the Ohio Valley. Id. at 560.
15. See DAVIS, at 120.
16. Ibid.
17. Id. at 122; 1 LOUISIANA UNDER THE RULE OF SPAIN, FRANCE, AND THE
UNITED STATES 1785-1807, at 37 (Robertson ed. 1911).
18. See 2 FORTIER, at 208.
19. See 1 LOUISIANA UNDER THE RULE OF SPAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1785-1807, at 69 (Robertson ed. 1911). The phrases "New Orleans mer-
chants" and "merchants of New Orleans" are used in this paper to refer to the
wealthy or cultured inhabitants of cities or towns who were connected with com-
merce, such as factors, lawyers, or bankers, unless the text indicates that the
phrases are to be given a narrower meaning.
20. See Declouet, Memorial to the Spanish Government (Faye ed. Dec. 7,
1814), 22 LA. HIST. Q. 795 (1939) ; Franklin, Place of Thomas Jefferson in the
Expulsion of Spanish Medieaval Law from Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 319
(1942); Franklin, Eighteenth Brumaire in Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 917
(1942); Parkhurst, Don Pedro Farrot, A Creole Pepys, 28 LA. HIST. Q. 679
(1945).
21. See 3 GAYARRE, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 327 (3d ed. 1885) ; 1 LOUISIANA
UNDER THE RULE OF SPAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES, 1785-1807, at
283 (Robertson ed. 1911).
22. See Liljegren, Jacobinism in Spanish Louisiana (1792-1797), 22 LA. HIST.
Q. 47 (1939). Sentiment in favor of the Revolution was strongest in New Or-
leans. Orchestras at the theaters were frequently asked to play "La Marseillaise"
and the bloodthirsty air "Ca Ira" was commonly sung. See 3 GAYARRE, HISTORY
OF LOUISIANA 327 (3d ed. 1885).
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concealed conspiracies to overthrow the Spanish rule and to
substitute a democratic regime.2 3 One hundred fifty colonists
petitioned the French revolutionary government to seize the
colony from Spain.3 5 The French Louisianians were motivated
almost as much by love of France as by adherence to the prin-
ciples of the Revolution.2 5
In 1805, the Legislative Council, the legislative body estab-
lished by Congress for the Territory of Orleans, enacted the
Crimes Act, which repealed all existing criminal legislation, de-
fined crimes and misdemeanors, and provided that criminal pro-
ceedings should be conducted in conformity with the Common
Law of England, and the Practice Act, which provided a rather
simple body of procedural rules, taken mainly from Spanish
sources, for the trial of civil cases.26 Next year, the Legislative
Council by resolution adopted a compilation of Spanish laws as
the private substantive law of the Territory, but the resolution
was vetoed by W. C. C. Claiborne, the territorial governor. 27
The Council commissioned James Brown and Moreau Lislet to
prepare a digest of the substantive laws in force.2 8 Rather than
making the contemplated compilation, Brown and Lislet pre-
pared a code modelled in form upon the Code Napoleon and de-
rived in substance from the French and Spanish law. The Code,
officially called the Digest, was adopted in 1808.29
The transfer of Louisiana to the United States subordinated
all social struggles of the later colonial period to the more crit-
ical struggle that arose between American and Latin cultures.3 0
23. See Declouet, Memorial to the Spanish Government (Faye ed. Dec. 7,
1814), 22 LA. HIST. Q. 795 (1939) ; Liliegren, Jacobinism in Spanish Louisiana
(1792-1797), 22 LA. HIST. Q. 47 (1939) ; Parkhurst, Don Pedro Favrot, A Creole
Pepys, 28 LA. HIST. Q. 679 (1945). It was hoped that a revolutionary invasion
of the colony could be organized with the support of the United States. The
young men of Natchitoches actively attempted to establish a revolutionary gov-
ernment.
24. See 3 GAYARRE, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 327 (3d ed. 1885).
25. Ibid.
26. See McMahon, at 1.
27. See Franklin, Place of Thomas Jefferson in the Expulsion of Spanish
Mediaeval Law from Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 319 (1942).
28. See Introduction to LA. CODE OF PRACTICE OF 1870 at iii (Dart, 2d ed.,
1942) ; 3 FORTIER, at 12; McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 53 (2d ed. 1951).
Fortier indicates that Edward Livingston may also have been commissioned. See
2 FORTIER, LOUISIANA (BIOGRAPHICAL EDITION) 81 (1914).
29. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xvii-xx (Dainow ed. 1947).
The names "Digest of 1808" and "Civil Code of 1808" are now used interchange-
ably.
30. See McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 131 (2d ed. 1951).
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One facet of this struggle was the clash between Anglo-Ameri-
can and civil law.3 1
The last two hundred years in Central Europe, and the last
four hundred years in Western Europe, have been centuries
filled with the spirit of nationalism. The French of Louisiana,
although geographically remote from their mother country, had
strong nationalistic feelings.3 2 They had expelled Ulloa because
he was the instrument of Spanish rule,3 3 and thirty years later
some of them had supported the French Revolution partly be-
cause they thought the Revolution would bring about a return
of Louisiana to France.3 4 Nationalism, having as one of its char-
acteristics the desire to preserve national institutions without
regard to intrinsic worth, caused the French of Louisiana, when
they were confronted with American attempts to force the
Anglo-American law upon them, to struggle to retain the civil
law. 5 The Americans, motivated by loyalty to their law and a
belief in its superiority, sought to compel its adoption, but re-
laxed their efforts when they saw they were creating bitterness
and hatred.3 6
The Digest of 1808 was taken from both French and, Spanish
sources.3 7 Because the French and Spanish laws had common
roots in the Roman law,38 the Louisianians took greater interest
in the issue of civil law as opposed to Anglo-American law than
in the issue of French law as opposed to Spanish law.39 Anti-
Spanish feeling was present in some degree at the deliberations
of the redactors, however. Although the Commissioners were
instructed to prepare a digest of the laws in force in the Terri-
31. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xvi (Dainow ed. 1947)
Franklin, Eighteenth Brumaire in Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 514 (1942).
32. See Flory, Edward Livingston's Place in Louisiana Law, 19 LA. HIST. Q.
528 (1936).
33. See I FORTIER, at 159-212.
34. See 3 GAYARRE, HISTORY OF LOuISIANA 327 (3d ed. 1885).
35. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xvi (Dainow ed. 1961)
Flory, Edward Livingston's Place in Louisiana Law, 19 LA. HIST. Q. 528 (1936)
McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisiana, 9 TUL. L. REV. 17
(1934).
36. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xvi (Dainow ed. 1947).
It is clear that the French of Louisiana thought that the Anglo-American law was
not so refined as the civil law. Their view had a sound foundation with respect
to certain legal areas. But the French appear to have been influenced by national-
ism much more deeply than the Anglo-Americans, because they had closer ties to
Europe, the source of nationalism.
37. Id. at xvii.
38. Id. at xiii.
39. Id. at xvi; MCMAHON, The Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisi-
ana, 9 TuL. L. REV. 17 (1934).
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tory of Orleans40 (roughly the present State of Louisiana) 41 and
although the laws in force were Spanish,42 many of the provi-
sions of the Digest of 1808 were taken from the Code Napoleon
or from the projet for the Code Napoleon. 43
The dominant purpose of the Commissioners in drafting the
Digest of 1808 was to retain the civil law.44 Yet, they could not
have grasped civilian rules blindly; if their only goal had been
the preservation of the civil law, they would have adopted the
Code Napoleon. 45 In selecting the provisions of the Civil Code
of 1808, the Commissioners must have considered the effect
that these provisions would produce in the light of prevailing
social conditions and philosophical beliefs.
No conflict between the propertied and the poorer classes
existed in 1808. The poor were inarticulate because they were
lacking in education46 and almost without class consciousness 47
because land could be easily acquired. 48
The sugar planters and the merchants of New Orleans lived
differently, held dissimilar attitudes, and had divergent inter-
ests. They could have reenacted two ancient struggles, that of
feudal landholder and city merchant, and that of debtor and
creditor. Their struggle, with respect to the law, was principal-
ly that of debtor and creditor.
Although the sugar planter was feudal in his attitude toward
his slaves and his land,49 he favored democratic government.50
His views were suggested by his knowledge of the events of the
French Revolution and by his reading of revolutionary litera-
ture.51 He thought that democratic government was desirable
because it would improve the condition of men in general. Yet,
40. See Introduction to LA. CODE OF PRACTICE OF 1870, at iii (Dart, 2d ed.,
1942) ; 3 FORTIER, at 12; MCGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISI-ANA 53 (2d ed. 1951).
41. See 3 FORTIR, at 12.
42. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xiv (Dainow ed. 1947).
43. Id. at xviii, xix.
44. See McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 131 (2d ed. 1951).
45. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xviii, xix (Dainow ed.
1947).
46. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 31 (1939).
47. See id. at 28; McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 142 (2d ed. 1951).
48. See DAVIS, LOUISIANA: THE PELICAN STATE 122 (1959).
49. See Franklin, Place of Thomas Jefferson in the Expulsion of Spanish
Mediaeval Law from Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 319 (1942) ; Franklin, Eigh-
teenth Brumaire in Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 914 (1942).
50. See note 20 supra.
51. See Liijegren, Jacobinism in Spanish Louisiana (1792-1797), 22 LA. HIST.
Q. 47 (1939).
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he claimed the right to hold slaves52 and, in 1812, he assisted in
obtaining the adoption of a state constitution providing for gov-
ernment by the propertied classes.5 Intellectually he favored,
but emotionally he feared popular government. He reached the
compromise typical of the nineteenth century landed classes in
supporting a government democratic in concept but oligarchic
in spirit.
The planter could have attempted to perpetuate feudal con-
ditions through the provisions of the Code of 1808. The right of
primogeniture54 and the fidei commissum and substitution 55
could have been recognized. The planter did not press for the
adoption of such provisions.50 His democratic principles 57 pre-
vented his favoring them and the great availability of land5"
rendered the use of legal devices to keep land in the family un-
necessary. In the civil law land became a form of wealth, al-
though the planter did not consider it as such in his private
views.59
The conflict between planter and merchant, thus, was basic-
ally that of debtor and creditor, although the attitudes of feudal
landowner and city merchant added a second dimension to the
conflict. The creditor sought to limit the debtor's freedom of
conduct as much as possible so that the debtor could not injure,
52. See 3 FORTIER, at 12.
53. See La. Const. art. II, § 28 (1812). This provision restricted the right to
vote to those who had bought public land or paid state taxes. The effect of this
provision was to disqualify two-thirds of the adult freemen from voting and to
place the government in the hands of a ruling coalition of planters and New
Orleans merchants. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 121-
22 (1939).
54. The right of primogeniture was recognized in various local French customs
before the French Revolution, see 4 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no, 135-
137 (6th ed. 1846-48), although it was not recognized in the written law based
upon the Roman law which prevailed in other parts of France. See id. no 131.
55. The fidei commissum and the substitution were specifically forbidden in
the Digest of 1808. See La. Civil Code art. 40, p. 216 (1808).
56. Mr. Franklin suggests that the landed classes urged the passage of the
resolution of 1808 (vetoed by Governor Claiborne) listing the Spanish laws which
were to be in force in the Territory of Orleans because many of the Spanish laws
designated were appropriate for a feudal society. See note 49 supra. However,
it is much more probable that this resolution received the support of the landed
classes, as of the other classes, because it removed doubt as to which civilian
authorities constituted the law of the Territory and tended to assure the reten-
tion of the civil law. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xviii
(Dainow ed. 1947) ; 3 FORTIER, at 37-60; 1 FORTIER, LOUISIANA (BIOGRAPHICAL
EDITION) 218-19 (1914); HATCHER, EDwARD LIVINGSTON 116-20, 246, 247
(1940); 2 LOUISIANA UNDER THE RULE OF SPAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1785-1807, at 355 (Robertson ed. 1911).
57. See note 20 supra.
58. See DAVIS, LOUISIANA: THE PELICAN STATE 120 (1959).
59. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 117 (1939).
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destroy, or alienate his property to the detriment of the credi-
tor; the debtor sought to broaden his freedom of action in the
use and alienation of his property as much as possible. In the
administration of successions, the creditor sought close regula-
tion so that the personal representative, heirs, and legatees could
not injure, destroy, or alienate succession property and, thus,
leave him without security. The debtor and possible heirs or
legatees sought freedom from administration except in cases in
which the heirs or legatees might be unable to manage the dece-
dent's property themselves because they were absent or incompe-
tent. If an administration was legally required, the debtor and
possible heirs or legatees would favor an administration as
loosely regulated as possible so that they and the succession rep-
resentative could manage the affairs of the decedent without
outside interference. If the succession was testate, the executor
would probably be a friend of the decedent; if the succes-
sion was intestate, the administrator would probably be one of
the heirs. The possibility was far greater that the succession
representative would injure the creditors than that he would in-
jure the heirs or legatees. The creditors would have nothing to
gain from a loosely regulated administration (unless they were
in collusion with the executor or administrator).
Most of the population in the southeastern part of the Terri-
tory of Orleans lived on the narrow belts of high alluvial land
that bordered the streams and rivers 0 Behind the occupied
land lay uninhabited forest, marsh, and swamp.,' The settle-
ments on the Red River lay in a fertile valley beyond which were
hilly woodlands0 2 with few inhabitants.6 3 In the most densely
populated parts of the Territory64 the wilderness was not far
away.65 Its nearness caused Louisianians to resent legal re-
straint 66 and to seek a loosely regulated administration of suc-
cessions.
The redactors of the Civil Code of 1808, James Brown and
Moreau Lislet,6 7 were residents of New Orleans.68 Although the
60. See note 13 supra.
61. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 7-9 (1939).
62. See id. at 10 (Struggle in Louisiana) and inner cover ("Regional Map")
DAVIS, LOUISIANA: THE PELICAN STATE 120 (1959).
63. See DAVIS, LOUISIANA, THE PELICAN STATE 120 (1959).
64. Ibid.
65. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 9 (1939).
66. As an example, see SAXON, OLD LOUISIANA 112-13 (1929).
67. See note 28 supra.
68. See 1 FORTIER, LOUISIANA (BIOGRAPHICAL EDITION) 132 (1914); 2 id.
at 71.
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evidence does not indicate that they favored one element of so-
ciety, it is clear that they did not seek to gratify the feudal in-
stincts of the planters. If lawyers from the plantation districts,
allied to the planters, had been commissioned to prepare the
Civil Code of 1808, the planters' emotional affection for feudal-
ism might have overcome their intellectual advocacy of democ-
racy and a code feudal in nature might have been adopted.
The Louisiana Purchase removed trade difficulties created
by Spanish control of the lower Mississippi River 9 and permit-
ted settlement of the American Middle West through New Or-
leans.70 The growth of commerce upon the Mississippi River 7'
caused the Louisianians gradually to become more commercial
than feudal in their interests. 72
Because the climate of southeastern Louisiana was subtrop-
ical, the planters grew sugar cane rather than cotton, although
it was more expensive to cultivate than other southern crops. 74
The importance of commerce to the welfare of the state75 and
the highly capitalized nature of sugar production 76 forced the
sugar planter to become more commmercial in his attitude than
other southern planters.77
The central struggle between planter and merchant was that
of debtor and creditor, or, considered in almost the same man-
ner, that of agriculture and commerce. In drafting the Consti-
tution of 1812, the planter and the merchant had entered into an
alliance of the aristocratic and wealthy against the poor and un-
tutored.78 In the years following 1820, the planter was induced
by the increasing importance of commerce partially to abandon
his debtor or agricultural sentiments and to enter into a second
political alliance with the merchants of New Orleans favoring
a commercial society and the American System of Clay and
Adams over an agricultural society.79 The American System in-
69. See Liliegren, Jacobinism in Spanish Louisiana (1792-1797), 22 LA. HIST.
Q. 47 (1939).
70. See, NAU, THE GERMAN PEOPLE OF NEW ORLEANS (1850-1900) 9 (1958).
71. See STANDARD HISTORY OF NEW ORLEANS 560 (Rightor ed. 1900).
72. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 112-13 (1939).
73. See id. at 14.
74. See DAVIS, LOUISIANA: THE PELICAN STATE 117 (1959).
75. See McLure, The Elections of 1860 in Louisiana, 9 LA. HIST. Q. 601
(1926).
76. See McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 131 (2d ed. 1951).
77. See STANDARD HISTORY OF NEW ORLEANS 560 (Rightor ed. 1900).
78. See note 53 8upra.
79. See MCGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 131 (2d ed. 1951).
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volved the discouragement of unsound financial speculation."
The New Orleans merchant and sugar planter combined in seek-
ing greater security for the creditor 8' and a more closely regu-
lated administration of successions.
Although many Americans came to Louisiana in the period
before statehood, the number who migrated to Louisiana in the
period between 1814 and 1830 was much greater.8 2 Coming
from all parts of the eastern seaboard,8 3 they settled in the
southeastern part of the state.8 4 Not all of these settlers re-
sumed their former occupations. s5 Some who had been laborers,
merchants, or small farmers became planters,8 but retained the
social and political attitudes of their former occupations. Be-
cause of their influence, the original Louisiana planters and the
newly-arrived planters who had belonged to the landed classes
in the east8 7 became more commercial in their point of view.
Conversely, some men who had been landowners in the east be-
came merchants in Louisiana.8 They lost their former attitudes
rather quickly, because Louisiana society was essentially com-
mercial. 9
The entry of the Americans strengthened the cultural link
forged between Louisiana and the United States by the Louisi-
ana Purchase. American lawyers, or Louisianians trained in the
Anglo-American law, occupied both bench and bar in many cases
tried before the Louisiana courtsY0
The French Louisianians, in 1803, usually lived on the same
farms or plantations or in the same towns all of their lives.91
The creditor's knowledge of the character, condition, and activi-
ties of the population tended to reduce the utility of a closely
regulated administration of successions. The movement of the
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid. See also McLure, The Elections of 1860 in Louisiana, 9 LA. HIST.
Q. 601 (1926).
82. See DAVIS, LOUISIANA: THE PELICAN STATE 117 (1959).
83. Ibid.
84. See McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 141 (2d ed. 1951); SHUGo,
ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 14, 64 (1939).
85. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 31-33 (1939).
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. See McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 131 (2d ed. 1951); SHUGG,
ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 112-13 (1939).
90. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xxiv (Dainow ed. 1947);
McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1 (1960).
91. See note 3 supra.
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Americans into Louisiana after the War of 1812 ended this sit-
uation; Louisiana became, in the words of the redactors of the
Civil Code of 1825, "a country where there are a great many
strangers." 92 Although the Americans themselves probably re-
sented governmental control, 98 their entry made greater regu-
lation of the administration of successions necessary. Louisiana
became a land filled with "strangers," in which the creditor
might know nothing of the character, condition, or activities of
the debtor, his other creditors, or his possible heirs or legatees.
In 1825, the French inhabitants of Louisiana continued to
feel a nationalistic preference for the French over the Spanish
law. This feeling was reflected in the Civil Code adopted that
year, which was much more strongly influenced by the French
law than the Digest of 1808 had been.94
In the period between 1830 and 1860, a different type of
American, the small cotton farmer of the southeastern United
States, entered Louisiana 5 and became the principal element in
the free population of the northern part of the state, in which
he settled. 96 Politically a Jacksonian Democrat, 97 he became the
political opponent of the sugar planter and New Orleans mer-
chant, who had become Whigs.9 8
In the lowland areas of the northern part of the state, a
plantation system based upon the cultivation of cotton99 was
gradually developed. I °° The cotton plantations of northern Lou-
isiana did not become as important economically as the sugar
plantations in the southeastern part of the state.101
At the same time, immigrants, mostly German and Irish,'10
2
92. See LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF CIVIL CODE OF 1825, 157
(1937).
93. See TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, passim (1889).
94. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xxi (Dainow ed. 1947).
95. See McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 141 (2d ed. 1951); SHuGG,
ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 64 (1939) [hereinafter cited as.
SHUGGI.
96. See note 84 supra.
97. See McGINTY, at 141; SHUGG, at 149.
98. See McGINTY, at 136.
99. Id. at 14.
100. See SHUGG, at 6, 7.
101. In 1860 seventeen percent of the assessed property of the state lay in
the alluvial lowlands north of the Red River and sixty percent in the alluvial
lowlands south of the Red River. See id. at 316. Part of 'northern Louisiana lies
south of the Red River, because the Red River crosses the state diagonally, but,
most of the alluvial land of northern Louisiana lies north of the Red River. See
id. inner cover, "Regional Map."
102. Id. at 38, 39.
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settled'in New Orleans in large numbers. 10 3 The tide of immi-
gration was so great that in 1850 one-fourth of the population
of the state was foreign-born.10 4 Most of the immigrants be-
came laborers and were used as pawns by the New Orleans poli-
ticians.10 Feeling no strong ties with the political parties of the
state or nation, the Irish in general voted for the Democrats and
the Germans for the Whigs. 1
0 6
In 1837, when fourteen banks in New Orleans suspended
specie payments as a result of the financial crisis of that year,107
hundreds of farmers and planters lost their lands.0 8 The resent-
ment of the sugar planters brought about a temporary weaken-
ing of their alliance with the New Orleans merchants. A con-
flict between friends and foes of the banks developed in the,
legislative session of 1838.109 A bill regulating the activities of
the banks was introduced and passed over the opposition of the
banking interests." 0 The bill was vetoed by the Governor, how-
ever, and the legislature failed to override his veto."'
In 1839 Louisiana banks resumed specie payments." 2 The,
state was flooded with worthless bank notes." 8 In the latter
part of 1841 specie payments were again suspended," 4 to be re-
sumed again in 1842."I5 In 1842 and 1843, the legislature suc-
cessfully enacted new banking regulations" that made Louisi-
ana banks the most financially sound in the United States. n7
Three times in the 1830's Jacksonian Democrats had intro-
duced resolutions in the legislature for the calling of a constitu-
tional convention. The first two resolutions had been approved
by the House, but rejected by the Senate. The third passed both
103. See NAU, THE GERMAN PEOPLE OF NEW ORLEANS 1850-1900, at 9-25
(1958).
104. See DAVIS, LOUISIANA: THE PELICAN STATE 173 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS].
105. See SHUGG, at 91, 118, 146-47.
106. Ibid.
107. See 3 FORTIER, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 226 (1904) [hereinafter cited
as FORTIER].
108. See DAVIS, at 179.
109. See CALDWELL, A BANKING HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 62 (1935).
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. See STANDARD HISTORY OF NEW ORLEANS 597 (Rightor ed. 1900) [here-
inafter cited as RIGHTOR].
113. See RIGHTOR, at 597.
114. See 3 FORTIER, at 230.
115. See RIGHTOR, at 599.
116. See CALDWELL, A BANKING HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 62 (1935).
117. Ibid.
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Houses but was vetoed by the Governor."" The financial crisis
of 1837 and the accompanying financial distress of the small
cotton farmers and sugar planters 19 strengthened popular senti-;
ment in favor of Jacksonian Democracy. 20 In 1841, the Gov-
ernor signed a resolution for the calling of a constitutional con-:
Vention. 1 2
1
The Constitutional Convention, which met in 1845,122 con-
tained twice as many Democrats as Whigs. 123 The Democrats
were predominantly from the northern and central parishes, the
Whigs predominantly from New Orleans and the surrounding
southern parishes. 124 The Constitution that they prepared re-
moved property qualifications for voting 125 and provided for
universal white manhood suffrage. 126 The distrust the Jackson-
ian Democrats felt for commerce prompted the convention of
1845127 to forbid the legislature's pledging the faith of the state
behind private obligations, 12 to limit the amount of debts that
could be legislatively contracted,'2 to forbid the chartering of
banks, 30 to limit the lives of corporations to twenty-five
years,' 31 and to limit the lives of legislatively granted monopolies
to twenty years. 132
In this period, the anti-commercial feelings of small farm-
ers might have caused a less closely regulated administration of
successions to be permitted. Although a desire to weaken or to
eliminate the commercial characteristics of the law existed, 33
few changes were made. The banks of New Orleans were very
powerful, having the power to coerce the legislators by refusing
to make loans and by calling for the immediate payments of
debts. 3 4 More important, the emotional force of Jacksonian
Democracy was not powerful enough to bring the small farmers
to the polls in numbers. Although universal white manhood suf-
118. See SHUGG, at 124.
119. Sed DAVIS, at 179.
120. See McGINTY, at 142.
121. See SHUGG, at 124-25.
122. Id. at 125.
123. Ibid.
124. Id. at 126.
125. Ibid.
126. La. Const. art. 10 (1845).
127. See SHUGG, at 134.
128. See La. Const. art. 113 (1845).
129. See id. art. 114.
130. See id. arts. 122, 123.
131. See id. art. 124.
132. See id. art. 125.
133. See Succession of Christy, 6 La. Ann. 427 (1851).
134. See 4 GAYA E, HIsToaY OF LOUISIANA 660 (4th ed. 1903).
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frage was permitted, 18 5 few men voted who had not been per-
mitted to vote under the Constitution of 1812.186 As a result, the
New Orleans merchant-sugar planter coalition regained partial
control of the government. 87
The Jacksonian farmers were disappointed by the failure of
the Constitution of 1845 to produce the Democratic changes that
they had sought. 3 8 A new constitutional convention was called,
which met in 1852.139 Two-thirds of the delegates being
Whigs,140 the hopes of the small farmers were dashed at the
outset.
Although the Constitution of 1852 retained universal white
manhood suffrage,' 4 ' apportionment of legislative seats in both
Houses was made dependent upon total population, 142 rather
than white population. Having a larger proportionate Negro
population than the other parishes, the plantation parishes, po-
litically dominated by the planters, received a greater number
of seats in the legislature than their white population would
justify. 143 Although the Whig party was moribund nationally' 4"
and declining in influence in Louisiana, 45 the propertied classes
whom it had once represented, through the device of "slave rep-
resentation," regained complete political control of the state.14
Most of the anti-commercial provisions of the Constitution
of 1845 were rejected by the Constitution of 1852. The legisla-
ture was permitted to contract debts in unlimited amount,147 to
charter banks,148 and to make loans to or to subscribe for the
stock of companies formed for the making of internal improve-
ments. 49 The provisions of the Constitution of 1845 limiting
the lives of corporations and legislatively granted monopolies' 50
were repealed by omission. 15'
135. See La. Const. art. 10 (1845).
136. See SHUGG, at 130-31.
137. Ibid.
138. Id. at 135.
139. Id. at 135, 136.
140. Id. at 136.
141. See La. Const. art. 10 (1852).
142. See La. Const. arts. 8, 15, 16 (1852).
143. See SHUGO, at 137-44.
144. See id. at 138, 139; McLure, Election8 of 1860, 9 LA. HIST. Q. 601
(1926).
145. See note 144 8upra.
146. See SHUoo, at 137-44.
147. See La. Const. art. 111 (1852).
148. See id. art. 118.
* 149. See id. arts. 108-110.
150. See La. Const. arts. 124, 125 (1845).
151. See La. Const. (1852).
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One token victory was granted the Democrats in the Consti-
tution of 1852. Judgeships, which until 1852 had been appoint-
ive,15 2 were made elective.15 3 The constitutional change had lit-
tle effect upon the nature of the men who occupied the bench,
because few laborers and small farmers voted. 54
After the victory of the commercial or propertied' 5 interests
in 1852, the law regulating the administration of successions
might have been altered so that commercial conditions would be
more fully recognized and commercial interests would be more
fully protected. Little change occurred, however. The lower
classes, at any moment they might become aroused, could vote
in full strength and elect men of their views to office. Even in
the plantation parishes, the small farmers outnumbered the
planters. 56 It was unlikely that any change in the law govern-
ing the administration of successions would, in itself, arouse
enough popular resentment to bring the common people to the
polls in numbers, but changes in the law governing the admin-
istration of successions combined with other legal changes
would, if carried beyond a certain unknown point, produce such
a result. Fearful of an agrarian revolution by means of the
ballot, 57 the upper classes, once they had returned to power,
avoided undertaking actions that would arouse class feeling.1 58
The alliance between the sugar planter and the New Orleans
merchant was precarious. Although the sugar planter acknowl-
edged the practicality of protecting commerce, he was a debt-
or 5 9 and a landowner, still emotionally tied to a feudal society' 60
that was slowly disappearing. He looked upon commerce as
something to be tolerated, not admired. The New Orleans mer-
chant, the planter's creditor, 161 was strongly commercial in his
attitudes. 162 The two groups were united only by a common
acknowledgment of the necessity of protecting commerce163 and
by a common fear of the small cotton farmer to the north. 6 4
152. See 3 FORTIER, at 251.
153. See La. Const. arts. 64, 81 (1852).
154. See SHUOG, at 130-31.
155. See McLure, The Elections of 1860, 9 LA. HIST. Q. 602 (1926).
156. See SHUGG, at 26.
* 157. Id. at 143.
158. Id. at 155, i56.
159. See CALDWELL, A BANKING HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 60-61 (1935).
160. See SHUGO, at 117.
161. See CALDWELL, A BANKING HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 60-61 (1935).
162. See SIIUGG, at 36.
163. See McLure, The Elections of 1860 in Louisiana, 9 LA. HIST. Q. 601
(1926).
164. See SHUGG, at 143.
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Any action or combination of actions designed to produce great-
er security for the creditor - i.e., change of the kind thatl would
include a more, tightly regulated administration of successions
-might upset the finely balanced coalition of merchant ana
planter and throw the small cotton farmer into control of the
state.
The Constitution of 1845 had produced one lasting effect.
Before 1845," although no state appropriated more money for
public education in proportion to its population than Louisi-
ana,165 public education on the primary level was inadequate. I6 6
More than half the money appropriated for public schools was
used to subsidize colleges and academies. 67 Very few children
attended public primary schools because attendance was consid-
ered to stigmatize them as paupers.16 8 A more satisfactory sys-
tem of public education was established by the Constitution of
1845169 and continued under the Constitution of 1852.170 Al-
though the schools declined in quality after 1853,' 7 1 the educa-
tion of the lower classes was begun. Their education caused
them to become more interested in public affairs and, thereby,
to become more powerful politically.
Although Louisiana's great landholdings, slavery, and small
cotton farms rendered the state essentially a part of the South,
geographical position and population set it apart. Because it lay
at the mouth of the Mississippi River, it was more commercial
than agricultural in its interests.172 In 1850, more of its free
population engaged in commerce than in agriculture.' 7 ' In cap-
ital its banks exceeded those of New York in the years 1835-
1842.174 Its merchants and sugar planters favored the American
system,176 which most of the South feared and opposed.176 The
Louisiana legislature in 1833 had unanimously adopted a resolu-
165. Id. at 69. The first public school legislation in Louisiana was enacted
by the legislature of the Territory of Orleans in 1805. See Noble, Governor Clai-
borne and the Public School System of the Territorial Government of Louisiana,
11 LA* HIST. Q.! 535 (1928).
166. See SHUGG, at 69.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid.
169. See La. Const. arts. 133-139 (1845).
170. See La. Const. arts. 135-140 (1852).
171. See SHUGG, at 74. At one time half of the educable children in the state
had attended school; in 1858, only one-third of the children were in school.
172. See id. at 112-13.
173. Id. at 16.
* 174. See CALDWZLL, A BANKING HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 32 (1935).
.- 175. See McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 131 (2d ed. 1951).
176. See DANGERFIELD, THE ERA OF GOOD FEELING 320 (1952).
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tion condemning nullification in South Carolina. 177 The popula-
tion as a whole was somewhat reluctant to support secession in
1860 and 1861 because it feared that secession would disrupt
traffic on the Mississippi River. 17 Louisiana was the only for-
mer French or Spanish colony in the South in which the French
and Spanish still constituted an important cultural element ;17 19
the better-educated French inhabitants still spoke French, at-
tended the French opera, and read French novels. °80 Many im-
migrants were present in Louisiana.' 18 In 1850, one-fourth of
the population of the state was foreign-born. 8 2 Several German
newspapers were published in New Orleans ;183 two, the Deutsche
Zeitung and the Staats-Zeitung, remained in existence for many
years.8 4 Many Louisianians either had come from the North or
were descended from persons who had come from the North.8 5
Because Louisiana did not resemble the South completely, it did
not fully identify itself with the South. Its thoughts, customs,
ideals, and tastes were never completely southern. This absence
of complete identification with the South had a noticeable effect
upon the Louisiana law, of a negative character. If Louisiana
had more fully identified itself with the rest of the South, south-
ern nationalism would have induced it to make greater efforts
to produce conformity between its law and that of other south-
ern states.
The influence of the Anglo-American law in Louisiana was
strongest in the years between 1870 and 1900,186 the period in
which Louisiana identified itself most fully with the South be-
cause of the common experiences of Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion. Undoubtedly, feelings of loyalty to the South were partly
responsible for the increase in Anglo-American influence in this
177. See 3 FORTIER, at 222; McLure, The Elections of 1860 in Louisiana,
9 LA. HIST. Q. 602 (1926).
178. See McLure, The Elections of 1860 in Louisiana, 9 LA. HIST. Q. 602
(1926).
179. See SHUGG, at 35.
180. Ibid.
181. See, NAU, THE GERMAN PEOPLE OF NEW ORLEANS 1850-1900, at 9-25
(1958) [hereinafter cited as NAU].
182. See DAvis, at 173.
183. See NAU, at 60.
184. See Clark, The German Liberals in New Orleans (1840-1860), 20 LA.
HIST. Q. 137 (1937) ; NAU, at 60.
185. See SHUGG, at 157. In 1850, New Orleans had more residents from New
York or Pennsylvania than from any southern state except Louisiana. See Greer.
Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861, 12 LA. HIST. Q. 381 (1929).
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period. After 1900, the influence of the Anglo-American law de-
clined and a movement developed to return to the civil law.187
In 1864, a constitutional convention met, composed of dele-
gates elected from the parishes that were within Union lines. 188
Union lines at that time contained only Orleans Parish 89 and
seventeen rural parishes, most of which were in the southeast-
ern part of Louisiana. 90 Representation was based upon white
population rather than upon total population.' 91 Negroes were
not permitted to vote in the election of delegates. 192 Sixty-three
delegates, most of whom were allied to the laboring classes, came
from New Orleans and thirty-three from the rural parishes. 98
The Constitution the delegates prepared abolished slavery'" but
restricted the franchise to members of the white race. 95 It di-
rected the legislature to levy an income tax' 96 and established
minimum wages and maximum hours for laborers employed in
public works.197 Drastic changes might have been made in the
civil law if laborers had controlled the first legislature to meet
under the new Constitution.
However, the first legislature, which met in 1865, was com-
posed principally of Confederate veterans allied to the merchant-
planter coalition. 98 Rather than enacting liberal legislation, it
passed a "black code" that made Negroes virtual peons' 99 and
refused to ratify the fourteenth amendment.2°°
In February of 1867, the radical wing of the Republican
party in Congress passed a bill dividing the former states of the
Confederacy, with the exception of Tennessee, which had rati-
fied the fourteenth amendment,20' into five military districts.20 2
186. See Introduction to LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at xxv-xxx (Dainow ed.
1947); McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1
(1960).
187. See McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1
(1960).
188. See 4 FOaRTIE, at 51.
189. See SHUOG, at 201.
190. Ibid.
191. Id. at 200.
192. Id. at 201.
193. Ibid.
194. See La. Const. art. 1 (1864).
195. Id. art. 14.
196. Id. art. 124.
197. Id. arts. 134, 135.
198. See 4 FORTIER, at 72.
199. See SHUOG, at 218.
200. Ibid.
201. See 4 FORTIEaR, at 91-92.
202. Id. at 92.
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Reconstruction began.20 - A new constitutional convention was
called that met in 1867.204 Although a majority of the delegates
were Negroes, 20 5 the committee appointed to prepare the new
constitution contained five white and four Negro members.2"
The members divided by race and submitted separate reports.2 7
The Negro delegates hoped to break up the landed estates
through the constitution that was being prepared. 20 8 If they
had succeeded in obtaining the constitutional provisions they
sought, great changes might subsequently have been made in
the law governing the administration of successions. The Con-
vention, however, rejected the first radical proposal of the
Negro delegates.20 9 Seeing that they could not gain their ob-
jectives, the Negro delegates made no further effort to destroy
the plantation system.2 10 The radical agrarian wing of the Con-
vention was defeated for two reasons. First, northern conserva-
tives feared that a redistribution of the land in the South would
incite northern factory workers to demand a similar redistribu-
tion of property in the North.2 11 Second, many white delegates
to the Convention hoped that they would become owners of plan-
tations.212
The Constitution of 1868 provided for representation on the
basis of total population ;213 but, unlike the Constitution of 1852,
it did not restrict the franchise to the white population. 214 Con-
federate veterans and Confederate sympathizers were disen-
franchised. 21 5 Their franchise was restored in 1870.210
The white members of the Reconstruction regime did not try
to break up the plantation system ;217 rather, they sought to ac-
203. Ibid.
204. Id. at 104.
205. Ibid.
206. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 221 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as SHUGG].
207. Ibid.
208. Id. at 243.
209. Ibid. The defeated proposal placed a limitation of 150 acres on the
amount of land which could be bought at a distress sale.
210. Id. at 243-44.
211. Id. at 244.
212. Id. at 247-49; WARMOTH, WAR, POLITICS, AND REcoNSTRUTION 5-12,
89, 260 (1930).
213. See La. Const. arts. 21, 30 (1868).
214. See id. art. 98.
215. See id. art. 99.
216. See 4 FORTIER, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 113 (1903) [hereinafter cited
as FORTIER].
217. See SHUGG, at 243.
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quire plantation property and to become planters.21 8 Property
taxes were raised to a level that was almost confiscatory.21
Fraud was used to acquire succession property.220 Although the
law governing the administration of successions might have
been modified so that succession property could be acquired
more easily, few changes were made. Succession property could
be acquired through the use of devices that were legal or almost
legal.221 By 1870, at least half the planters in the sugar parishes
were northern men or men who were financed by northern cap-
ital.2 2 The Reconstruction government did not seek the destruc-
tion of wealth. 228
The northerners who acquired plantations were highly com-
mercial in their attitude.224 They did not hold the feudal and
anti-commercial attitudes225 that lingered among the planters of
the old regime.226 The whole society without its knowledge and
against its will became permeated by their commercial point of
view.
In 1877, the Reconstruction government was overthrown and
a Democrat, Francis R. T. Nicholls, was installed as Governor.2 27
Few changes were made in the civil law, the new government
seeking principally to prevent the return to power of the Re-
construction government.
A new Constitution was adopted in 1879.225 One title was
devoted to the limitation of legislative power ;229 the state sought
to avoid a repetition of the legislative excesses of the Recon-
struction era. Although all men were permitted to vote without
racial limitations,230 soldiers and sailors of the United States
stationed in Louisiana were not permitted to acquire domicile in
the state.2' Legislative apportionment was to be based upon
218. See note 212 supra.
219. See SHUG, at 228.
220. See Heirs of Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 73, 16 So. 507 (1895).
Ludeling was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the Recon-
struction era. See 2 FORTIER, LOUISIANA (BIOGRAPHICAL EDITION) 105 (1914).
221. See Heirs of Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 73, 16 So. 507 (1895).
222. See SHUGG, at 249.
223. Id. at 243.
224. Id. at 248-49.
225. See note 49 supra.
226. See SHUGG, at 261.
227. See 4 FORTIER, at 184.
228.. Id. at 198.
229. See La. Const. arts. 43-57 (1879).
230. See id. arts. 184, 185.
231. See id. art. 164.
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total population.232 The sugar planter-New Orleans merchant
coalition returned to power and continued to govern the state
until Huey Long was inaugurated as Governor.238
The Populist party became very strong among the lower
classes in the 1890's,234 but it was unable to gain control of the
governorship. 235 The fusion of the Populists and the Democrats
in the presidential election of 1896 brought about the decline of
the Populist movement.23 The Populists did not offer a candi-
date for governor after the gubernatorial election of 1900.237
The power of the merchant-planter coalition was constantly
endangered by the vote of the lower classes and the Negro. After
the disappearance of the Populist party, the lower classes were
without political representation, because none of the factions of
the Democratic party represented their views.238 The enactment
of "white supremacy" legislation removed their fear of competi-
tion with the Negro and put them into a state of political leth-
argy.23 9
The Constitution of 1898 restricted the franchise to those
who could read and write or who owned property, but made an
exception in the case of one whose father or grandfather was
permitted to vote on January 1, 1867.240 The effect of this pro-
vision was to disenfranchise the Negro.241
The merchant-planter coalition was then in unchallenged con-
trol of the state. Few significant changes in the rules govern-
ing the administration of successions were made in this period,
however. The feudal attitudes of the sugar planter had gradual-
ly disappeared; commercial attitudes were everywhere present
among the governing classes. Rules requiring a more closely
regulated administration of successions were probably not in-
stalled because it was seen that the lower classes could control
the government if they were given effective leadership.
232. See id. arts. 16, 17.
233. See McGINTY, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 228-52 (2d ed. 1951) [herein-
after cited as McGINTY].
234. See Daniel, The Louisiana People's Party, 26 LA. HIST. Q. 1055 (1943).
235. See MCGINTY, at 235, 237-39, 243.
236. See SINDLER, HUEY LONG'S LOUISIANA 22 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
SINDLER].
237. See McGINTY, at 243, 246.
238. See SINDLER, at 25.
239. Id. at 21, 22; Daniel, The Louisiana People's Party, 26 LA. HIST. Q.
1055 (1943).
240. See La. Const. art. 197 (1898).
241. See MCGINTY, at 241.
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Huey Long aroused the dormant agrarianism of the small
farmer and, by his election as Governor in 1928, symbolically
achieved a class revolution. 242 For the first time since the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1864, the lower classes had obtained
the controlling voice in the government.243 Long obtained the
passage of public works legislation 244 and legislation giving fi-
nancial aid to the poor. 245 He proposed the "Share Our Wealth"
program, under which private fortunes in excess of $3,000,000.00
were to be liquidated and the proceeds distributed among the
members of the lower classes. 24 6 As part of the "Share Our
Wealth" program, the legislature repealed a statute providing
for the use of the private express trust.247 The small farmer's
distrust of commerce was still present.
If Long had not been assassinated,248 he might have pressed
for drastic changes in the civil law that would give less protec-
tion to the creditor and permit a less rigid administration of
successions. Although his immediate political successors were
of his political school, they abandoned the most effective ele-
ments of his program. They ignored Long's "Share Our Wealth"
proposals2 49 and permitted the passage of an act that re-estab-
lished the private express trust.250 The agrarian attitudes of the
lower classes disappeared under the prosperity they enjoyed
after the Second World War. The sweep of commercialism ab-
sorbed the Long revolution in its tide.
II. THE LAW ITSELF
In the Anglo-American law, an heir or a distributee is not
permitted to renounce an inheritance in the absence of an ex-
press statutory provision. 251 However, a devisee or a legatee is
permitted to renounce a devise or a bequest. 252 Even if the
testamentary gift or the interest in the estate is not renounced,
the heir, distributee, devisee, or legatee is not held liable for the
242. See id. at 252; SINDLER, at 26, 37.
243. See DAVIS, LOUISIANA: THE PELICAN STATE 286 (1959).
244. Ibid.
245. See McGINTY, at 252.
246. See SINDLER, at 84. See also LONG, EVERY MAN A KINo 293-98 (1933).
247. See SINDLER, at 131; McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisiana, 10 TUL.
L. Rav. 489 (1936).
248. Long was assassinated in 1935. See McGINTY, at 253.
249. See SINDLER, at 99.
250. See La. Acts 1938, No. 81. See also SINDLER, at 131.
251. See ATKINSON, WILLS, § 139 (2d ed. 1953).
252. Ibid.
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debts of the decedent beyond the decedent's assets.25 3 Unless a
small-estates statute is in force,2 54 the personal property of the
decedent falls under the judicially regulated administration of
a personal representative who has title for purposes of admin-
istration.2 55 In the absence of statute, title to real property
passes immediately to the heirs or devisees who take possession
without an administration. 256 Although formerly in the Anglo-
American law real property of the decedent could not be sold
to pay debts, this rule has been set aside by statute in all juris-
dictions. 257
In Louisiana law, an heir or a legatee under universal title
can accept the succession, renounce the succession, or accept the
succession with benefit of inventory. 258 An heir is one who takes
the succession if the decedent dies intestate or one who is a uni-
versal legatee. 25 9 A universal legatee is one who takes all the
property of the decedent, both movable and immovable,260 or one
who takes all the property of the decedent after the particular
legacies have been discharged. 26 The decisions of the Louisiana
courts are in conflict as to the definition of legatee under uni-
versal title; but, by the prevailing view, he is one who takes a
fractional proportion of the property of the decedent.262 The
legatee under universal title is not an heir,263 but he is subject
to most of the rules that govern heirs.264 The particular legatee,
one who is not a universal legatee or a legatee under universal
title,265 is not an heir 266 and is not subject to the rules govern-
ing heirs.267
253. See Rheinstein, European Methods for the Liquidation of Debts of the
Deceased Persons, 20 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1935).
254. See SIMES & FRATCHER, FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION 42-48 (2d ed. 1956).
255. See McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV.
1 (1960).
256. See ATKINSON, WILLS § 139 (2d ed. 1953). In many jurisdictions an
administration of real property is required by statute.
257. Ibid.
258. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 976, 977, 988, 1014, 1015, 1017, 1032, 1058
(1870) ; LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3001, 3361, 3362, 3371, 3372 (1960).
259. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 884 (1870).
260. See id. art. 1606.
261. See Pironi v. Riley, 39 La. Ann. 302, 1 So. 675 (1887) ; Eskridge v.
Farrar, 30 La. Ann. 718 (1878) ; Sarce v. Dunoyer's Executor, 11 La. 220
(1837).
262. See Gregory v. Hardwick, 218 La. 346, 49 So. 2d 423 (1950); Succes-
sion of Meyer, 198 La. 53, 3 So. 2d 273 (1941); Compton v. Prescott, 12 Rob.
56 (La. 1845). See also Succession of Chedome, 34 La. Ann. 1239 (1882); of.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1612 (1870).
263. See Succession of Price, 197 La. 579, 2 So. 2d 29 (1941).
264. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1430, 1613-1615 (1870).
265. See id. art. 1625.
266. See id. art. 884; Lacey v. Newport, 3 La. Ann. 226 (1848).
267. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1430, 1626-1643 (1870).
(Vol. XXIV
1963] ADMINISTRATION OF SUCCESSIONS 77
Title to and possession of both movable and immovable prop-
erty pass to the heir immediately upon the death of the decedent
under the doctrine of le mort saisit le vif.268 If the heir accepts
the succession unconditionally, 269 the succession does not fall
under administration.2 7 0 There are two exceptions to this gen-
eral rule. If the succession is not relatively free from debt and
the creditors demand an administration, the judge may, in his
discretion, require an administration although the heir has ac-
cepted unconditionally. 27 ' Also, if the creditor or particular
legatee demands security within three months after the render-
ing of the judgment of possession, the judge may, in his discre-
tion, require the heir to furnish security.272 Should the heir fail
to furnish security upon his being ordered to do so, the judg-
ment of possession is annulled and the succession is placed under
administration.2 7 s The heir who accepts the succession uncon-
ditionally is held personally liable for the debts of the decedent,
even beyond the value of the property he has received from the
succession.274 The creditor of the decedent who fails to demand
security or to bring an action appropriate to the enforcement of
his claim within three months after a judgment of possession
has been rendered ranks no higher than the creditor of the heir
with respect to the decedent's assets.275
268. See id. arts. 940-949; Tulane University v. Board of Assessors, 115 La.
1025, 40 So. 445 (1905) ; cf. State v. Brown, 32 La. Ann. 1020 (1880). Although
the universal legatee is an heir, he is invested with title and possession imme-
diately upon the death of the testator only if the testator has left no forced heirs
or if the testator's forced heirs have been legally disinherited. See LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 1607-1610 (1870).
269. See note 258 supra.
270. See LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 976-1013 (1870); LA. CODE OF CIVL PROCE-
DURE arts. 3001-3006, 3031, 3032 (1960) ; Succession of Land, 212 La. 97, 31
So. 2d 607 (1947) ; Griffing v. Taft, 151 La. 442, 91 So. 832 (1922) ; Scott v.
Briscoe, 36 La. Ann. 278 (1884) ; Succession of Walker, 32 La. Ann. 321 (1880) ;
Freret v. Heirs of Freret, 31 La. Ann. 506 (1879) ; Succession of Dunford, 25
La. Ann. 56 (1873) ; Succession of Dupuy, 4 La. Ann. 570 (1849) ; Succession
of Ducloslange, 1 La. Ann. 181 (1846) ; cf. Succession of Serres, 135 La. 1005,
66 So. 342 (1914), repudiated by LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3031 (1960).
271. See LA. CODE OF CIVrL PROCEDURE arts. 3004, 3031 (1960).
272. See id. arts. 3007, 3034, 3035.
273. See id. arts. 3008, 3034, 3035.
274. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1422-1432, 1611, 1614 (1870) ; Lawrence v.
Lawrence, 172 La. 587, 134 So. 753 (1931) ; Kelly v. Giles, 167 La. 287, 119
So. 51 (1928) ; Satcher v. Radesich, 153 La. 468, 96 So. 35 (1923) ; Claudel v.
Palao, 28 La. Ann. 872 (1876) ; Sevier v. Sargent, 25 La. Ann. 220 (1873);
Fowler v. Succession of Gordon, 24 La. Ann. 270 (1872) ; James v. Hynson, 21
La. Ann. 566 (1869) ; MeMasters v. Place, 8 La. Ann. 431 (1853) ; Gaiennie v.
Thompson, 6 La. Ann. 475 (1851).
275. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3007, 3008, 3034 (1960) ; LA.
R.S. 9:5011-9:5016 (1950) ; Sevier v. Gordon, 29 La. Ann. 440 (1877) ; Fowler
v. Succession of Gordon, 24 La. Ann. 270 (1872) ; Beck v. Beck, 181 So. 635 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1938).
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If the heir accepts with benefit of inventory, the succession,
in all cases, falls under administration. 27 6 The creditor of the
decedent retains his preferred position with respect to the as-
sets of the decedent during administration, but the liability of
the heir is limited to the assets that he receives from the dece-
dent.277
If the heir renounces the succession, he is not held liable for
the debts of the decedent.2 7 8 His renunciation relates back to the
date of death.27 9 The creditors of the heir may accept the suc-
cession with benefit of inventory if the heir has renounced it to
their detriment. 2s°
Following the example of Spanish law, 28 ' the Civil Code of
1808 did not permit the heir to go into possession until he had
judicially accepted the succession. 2 2 The French doctrine of le
mart saisit le vif283 was substituted in the Civil Code of 1825.284
The requirement that an heir perform a judicial act of accept-
ance before receiving title violated the spirit of the times. Liv-
ing near the wilderness, the heir resented judicial interference
in his affairs.2 5 And the French Louisianian, loyal to things
that were French, 2 6 preferred the French manner of treatment
of legal problems to the Spanish even without considering ap-
propriateness or effect.
Under the Civil Code of 1808, if an intestate succession was
accepted with benefit of inventory, all the heirs were permitted
to administer the succession without judicial appointment and
with little judicial interference, 28 7 as they were in the French
276. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3081-3159, 3361-3395 (1960).
277. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1054 (1870) ; McMahon, The Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1 (1960).
278. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 946 (1870).
279. Ibid.
280. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1021, 1071-1074 (1870).
281. See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF CIVIL CODE OF 1825, at
115 (1937).
282. Ibid.; Oppenheimn, An Introduction to the Louisiana Law of Successions,
4 LA. STAT. ANN. CIVIL CODE 1 (West 1952).
283. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1004, 1006, 1011, 1014; Rheinstein, Euro-
pean Methods for the Liquidation of Debts of Deceased Persons, 20 IowA L. REV.
431 (1935).
284. See La. Civil Code art. 934 (1825) ; O'Donald v. Lobdell, 2 La. 299
(1831).
285. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 9 (1939) [here-
inafter cited as SHUGG].
286. See Flory, Edward Livingston's Place in Louisiana Law, 19 LA. HIST.
Q. 528 (1936).
287. See La. Civil Code art. 104, p. 168 (1808) ; Oppenheim, One Hundred
Fifty Years of Succession Law, 33 TUL. L. REV. 43 (1958).
[Vol. XXIV
1963] ADMINISTRATION OF SUCCESSIONS 79
law.2s1 This system of administration was in keeping with the
popular desire to be free from judicial restraint 29 and with the
planter's private sense of family continuity.290 With the entry
of the Americans, the state became a land of "strangers." 2
91 It
was impractical to permit all heirs to administer because all
heirs often were not present. Greater judicial supervision of
the administration of successions became necessary because
creditors of the decedent, often ignorant of the conduct or even
the identity of the heirs, could be harmed by their uncontrolled
actions. The redactors of the Civil Code of 1825 were compelled
to follow the example of the Anglo-American law29 2 in provid-
ing for a closely regulated administration of intestate succes-
sions and for the judicial selection and appointment of admin-
istrators. 293
Under the Civil Code of 1808, the heir could elect to accept
the succession unconditionally without administration and there-
by take possession before paying the debts of the decedent.294
This practice subjected the decedent's creditor to peril. Partial
protection was afforded the creditor by the action for the sep-
aration of patrimony,295 which, however, could be brought only
within a limited time.296 By the separation of patrimony the
288. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 803; 7 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET COLIN,
TRAITIt DE DROIT CIVIL no 1318 (3d ed. 1905); 2 DALLOZ, CODES ANNOT-.S (Nou-
VEAU CODE CIVIL) art. 603, n 37 (1911); 3 DEMOLOMBE, SUCCESSIONS n 228
(1879); 3 MARCAD., EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL n0 260 (7th ed. 1873); 3
PLANIOL, DROIT CIVIL no, 2122, 2126 (11th ed. 1939) ; 4 TOULLIER, LE DROIT
CIVIL FRANCAIS n°, 369-95 (6th ed. 1846).
289. See SHUGO, at 9.
290. See note 49 supra.
291. See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF CIVIL CODE OF 1825, at
157 (1937).
292. See SHUGo, at 31-33.
293. See La. Civil Code arts. 1042, 1088-1203 (1825).
294. See La. Civil Code art. 72, p. 160 (1808).
295. See id. arts. 230-235, p. 202.
296. See id. art. 233, p. 202. The action for the separation of patrimony
could be brought within three years after the opening of the succession with re-
spect to movables and so long as the heir retained possession with respect to im-
movables under the Civil Code of 1808. In the Civil Code of 1825 the time within
which the action for the separation of patrimony could be brought was reduced
to three months from the date of acceptance by the heirs. This period applied
to both movable and immovable effects. See La. Civil Code art. 1409 (1825).
The redactors indicate that the 1808 rule restricted alienation in an unduly severe
manner. See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF CIVIL CODE OF 1825, at
198 (1937). The separation of patrimony, as such, has now been eliminated from
Louisiana law. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3007, 3008, 3035 (1960) ;
LA. R.S. 9:5011-5016 (1950). Under LA. R.S. 9:5011-5016 (1950), the statutory
substitute for the separation of patrimony, the creditor of a succession has a
privilege on all the property of the decedent which he enjoys for three months
after the decedent's death. If an affidavit of the claim is filed for recordation
in the mortgage records of a parish in which immovable succession property is
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property that the unconditional heir received from the decedent
was separated from the other property of the heir so that the
creditor of the decedent would be preferred to the creditor of the
heir as to the decedent's assets.297 In a land of "strangers" the
creditor of the decedent might not know of his debtor's death
and thus fail to bring the action for the separation of patrimony
within the required time. This danger was offset by the rule
that the heir by his unconditional acceptance of the succession
made himself liable for the debts of the decedent out of his own
assets although the decedent was insolvent.298 The heir did not
consider his being held personally liable for the debts of the
decedent unjust because the strength of family ties caused him
to feel that the child (who was in most cases the heir) should
be required to pay the debts of his parents. Because in 1808 vast
areas of land were unoccupied and fortunes were easily made,299
it was quite possible that the heir would be wealthy although the
decedent was insolvent. The gamble to which the creditor was
subjected by the heir's election to accept unconditionally with-
out administration could not be considered unfair.
By 1825 the gamble had become less fair because fortunes
could not be acquired so quickly. And society had become more
willing to consent to regulation. To reduce the risk to the cred-
itor inherent in the unconditional acceptance, the Civil Code was
altered in 1825 and 1828 to provide that the creditor of the
decedent could demand security from the heir accepting uncon-
ditionally and that the succession would be placed under admin-
istration if security was not furnished.300 Yet, because the
planter retained (in a weakened form) the outlook of a debtor
and the instincts of a feudal proprietor, and because the gen-
situated within this time, the creditor can bring an action to enforce the privilege
with respect to immovable property until three months after a judgment of pos-
session not preceded by an administration has been rendered or until three months
after the claim has been recorded (if the succession has not been opened judi-
cially), although more than three months have passed since the decedent died.
The statute does not state whether the life of the privilege with respect to mov-
ables may be extended in a similar fashion by the filing of an affidavit of the
claim.
297. See La. Civil Code art. 230, p. 202 (1808). The creditors of the heir
could demand a corresponding separation of estates. See id. art. 233, p. 202. For
the history of the rights of legatees, see La. Civil Code art. 1402 (1825) ; the
identical LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1449 (1870); and LA. R.S. 9:5011, 9:5013-5015
(1950), which replaced article 1449 by virtue of La. Acts 1960, Nos. 30, §2,
and 31, § 5.
298. See La. Civil Code art. 86, p. 164 (1808).
299. See SHUOo, at 31, 32.
300. As to intestate successions, see La. Civil Code art. 1005 (1825). As to
testate successions, see La. Acts 1828, No. 83, § 15.
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eral population still sought to be free from legal restraint, the
unconditional acceptance, thus modified, was retained.
In time the planters lost their feudal attitudes. The unoccu-
pied swamps and forests gradually became settled. Commercial-
ism, though not the commercial coalition of sugar planter and
New Orleans merchant, triumphed. But the desire to be free
from restraint did not disappear, although it lost intensity. In-
fluenced by the Anglo-American rule requiring an administra-
tion of personalty in all cases"°' and by prevailing conditions,
the redactors of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1960 retained
the unconditional acceptance 0 2 but provided that if the succes-
sion was heavily indebted and the creditors demanded an admin-
istration, an administration would be ordered although the heirs
accepted the succession unconditionally. 03 Unconditional ac-
ceptance being identified with absence of administration, this
provision represents a radical departure from civilian princi-
ples because it in effect gives the creditor the power to decide
whether the heir will accept unconditionally.
The Civil Code of 1808 permitted the testamentary executor
or the heirs administering an intestate succession to administer
all the property contained within the succession rather than
merely the movable property. 30 4 Louisiana, in 1808, could have
followed the Anglo-American law, which permitted only person-
alty to fall under administration, 0 5 or the French law, which
limited the seizin of the executor to movable property.30 6 Either
was in accord with the landowner's sense of the mystic power
of land.30 7 Rather, the Code of 1808 provided that both movables
and immovables were to fall under administration. Because of
his intellectual faith in democracy, 08 the Louisiana planter rare-
ly tried to impress his feudal attitudes upon the civil law.
The Civil Code of 1825 required that testate and intestate
successions be administered if one or more of the heirs claimed
301. See McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV.
1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as McMahon].
302. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDuRE arts. 3001, 3031 (1960).
303. See id. arts. 3004, 3031.
304. See La. Civil Code art. 104, p. 168, art. 166, p. 244 (1808).
305. See McMahon, at 1.
306. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1026.
307. See PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMoN LAW 724 (5th
ed. 1956).
308. See McGINTY, at 131.
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the benefit of inventory.83 This requirement was weakened by
judicial decisions in two respects. First, the rule was developed
that an intestate succession accepted with benefit of inventory
could not be placed under administration unless an administra-
tion was demanded by the creditors.3'0 The rule later was modi-
fied to make the placing of the succession under administration
discretionary with the trial judge if the creditors did not de-
mand an administration.311 Second, the courts held that the
tutor of a minor heir could administer an intestate succession
without special appointment unless the creditors demanded the
appointment of a true administrator.A12 The courts, in the adop-
tion of both rules, were influenced by the desire of the Louisi-
anians to achieve simplicity in legal relationships.
The adoption of the rule that made it mandatory to appoint
an administrator of an intestate succession accepted under bene-
fit of inventory only if the creditors demanded an administra-
tion appears to have been stimulated by an additional factor.
In the Roman law, if the heir did not renounce the succession,
he received all the property and rights of the decedent and be-
came liable for all his debts. 313 This doctrine of universal suc-
cession was modified by the Emperor Justinian, by whom a
third course was opened to the heir. He could have an inventory
taken of the decedent's assets and thereby restrict his liability
for the decedent's debts to the assets that he received. Even if
an inventory was taken, the succession did not fall under admin-
309. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1034, 1653 (1825).
310. See Succession of Weincke, 118 La. 206, 42 So. 776 (1907) ; Succession
of Lamm, 40 La. Ann. 307, 4 So. 450 (1888) ; Succession of Walker, 32 La. Ann.
321 (1880) ; Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann. 502 (1848) ; Bryan v. Atchison, 2
La. Ann. 462 (1847). The cases cited state that LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art.
967 (1870) and LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1041 (1870) were in conflict and that the
former controlled. The supposed conflict, it appears, could have been resolved by
holding that Civil Code article 1041 required the appointment of an adminis-
trator after the inventory had been made and Code of Practice article 967 re-
quired the court to appoint an administrator even before an inventory had been
made if the creditors demanded the appointment of an administrator. Cf. In the
Matter of Estate of Lewis, 32 La. Ann. 385 (1880) ; State v. Heirs of Leckie, 14
La. Ann. 641 (1859).
311. See Succession of Perot, 223 La. 412, 65 So. 2d 895 (1953) ; Succession
of Land, 212 La. 97, 31 So. 2d 607 (1947) ; Succession of Davis, 184 La. 969,
168 So. 118 (1936) ; Succession of Comeau, 158 La. 370, 104 So. 119 (1925).
312. See State ex rel. Jones v. City of Shreveport, 33 La. Ann. 1247 (1881)
Soye v. Price, 30 La. Ann. 93 (1878) ; Erwin v. Orillion, 6 La. 205 (1834) ; Suc-
cession of Reed, 157 So. 765 (La. App. 1934) ; cf. Arthur v. Cochran, 12 Rob.
41 (La. 1845) ; Self v. Morris, 7 Rob. 24 (La. 1844).
313. See 7 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET COLIN, TRAIT]t DR DROIT CIVIL no 117
(3d ed. 1905) ; 'Rheinstein, European Methods for the Liquidation of Debts of
Deceased Persons, 20 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1935) ; Comment, 22 TUL. L. REV. 87
(1953).
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istration.3 14 The doctrine of universal succession in France was
modified by the concept of the administration of successions, of
Germanic origin.3 15 A conflict within the law was produced.
Theories can be developed that logically reconcile the doctrine
of universal succession with the concept of administration, but
the conflict in spirit remains irreconcilable. As a result, no the-
ory explaining the relationship between the doctrine of univer-
sal succession and the concept of administration has consistently
been held.3 1 6 The Louisiana courts, in adopting the rule that
an administration of an intestate succession accepted with bene-
fit of inventory was mandatory only if the creditor demanded
an administration favored the doctrine of universal heirship
over the concept of administration.
The Code of Civil Procedure appears to require the appoint-
ment of an administrator of a succession accepted under benefit
of inventory in all cases,317 although no express statement to this
effect is given. The acceptance of this requirement represents,
first, a victory of the forces pressing for security for the creditor
over the forces pressing for freedom from judicial restraint and,
second, a victory of the Anglo-American3 18 and Germanic tend-
ency to favor administration over the Roman tendency to favor
universal heirship.
The French Civil Code provided that the testamentary exe-
cutor would have seizin (or roughly possession)3 1 9 only if it was
given him by will320 and that the executor's seizin was to last
for only one year.321 An executor who was not vested with seizin
was almost powerless.322 The same provisions were included in
the Louisiana Digest of 1808.323 The substitution was forbidden
in the French law3 24 and both the substitution and the fidei com-
314. See note 313 supra.
315. See 5 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DES DONATIONS no 1 (1880) ; 14 LAURENT,
PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS n0 375 (1875) ; Rheinstein, European Meth-
od8 for the Liquidation of Debts of Deceased Persons, 20 IowA L. REV. 431
(1935).
316. See Comment, 15 TUL. L. REV. 576 (1941).
317. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3001-3394 (1960).
318. See McMahon, at 1.
319. See 3 PLANIOL, DROIT CIVIL no. 2817-2820 (11th ed. 1939).
320. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1026; 3 PLANIOL, DROIT CIVIL aos 2820-2830
(11th ed. 1939).
321. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1026; 2 DALLOZ, CODES ANNOTAS (Nou-
VEAU CODE CIVIL) art. 1026, n° * 6, 14 (1911) ; 5 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DES DONA-
TIONS n 47 (1880); 5 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no 581 (6th ed.
1846-48).
322. See 3 PLANIOL, DROIT CIVIL no 2030 (11th ed. 1939).
323. See La. Civil Code arts. 166, 167, p. 244 (1808).
324. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 896.
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missum were forbidden in the law of Louisiana. If the executor
was permitted to hold immovable succession property for an in-
definite time after the death of the decedent, he would, by his
continued holding of the succession property, achieve in some
degree the results that would be achieved by the substitution.
To discourage such action by the executor, the redactors of the
Code Napoleon limited the period during which he could have
seizin to one year. They further reduced the possibility of using
the executor's office in this manner by providing that he could
have seizin only if it was given him by the decedent's will. The
redactors of the Civil Code of 1808, sensing the private feudal
sentiments of the planters, adopted the French system of per-
mitting the executor to have seizin only if it was given him by
will and, then, only for one year. It later became clear that the
civil law would not be used as a device to serve feudal ends in
Louisiana. The Louisiana courts, therefore, gradually obliter-
ated the distinctions made by the Civil Code between executors
with seizin and executors without Seizin and, in effect, gave all
executors almost full powers of administration.2 5 In the Code
of Civil Procedure the concept of seizin, as it applies to the
executor, is eliminated and all executors are given full powers
of administration. 26 This provision represents merely a codifi-
cation of the judicial blurring out of the concept of seizin as it
applies to executors.3 2
7
In the Anglo-American law all personalty of the decedent
falls under administration.322 Life insurance policies upon the
life of the decedent do not fall under administration unless they
are payable to his estate.8 29 Under the law of Louisiana, if the
succession is administered, all property of the decedent, both
movable and immovable, falls under administration.85 0 The pro-
325. Gregory v. Hardwick, 218 La. 346, 49 So. 2d 423 (1950) ; Succession
of Futch, 207 La. 807, 22 So. 2d 125 (1945) ; Succession of Patterson, 188 La.
113, 175 So. 320 (1937) ; Martin v. Himel, 174 La. 281, 140 So. 478 (1932);
Flanagan v. Land Development Co., 145 La. 843, 83 So. 39 (1919) ; Succession
of Kaiser, 48 La. Ann. 973, 20 So. 184 (1896); Succession of Townsend v.
Sykes, 38 La. Ann. 859 (1886) ; Succession of Ames, 33 La. Ann. 1317 (1881) ;
Florsheim Bros. v. Holt, 32 La. Ann. 133 (1880) ; Succession of Harris, 29 La.
Ann. 743 (1877) ; Livingston v. Gaussen, 21 La. Ann. 286 (1869) ; Succession
of Wederstrandt, 19 La. Ann. 494 (1867); Meissonier v. Laurent, 14 La. Ann.
14 (1859); Succession of Boyd, 12 La. Ann. 611 (1857); Succession of Cress-
well, 8 La. Ann. 122 (1853) ; Succession of Macarty, 3 La. Ann. 517 (1848)
Dunlap v. Bailey, 7 La. 368 (1834).
326. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3211 (1960).
327. Ibid.
328. See ATKINSON, WILLs no. 116 (2d ed. 1953).
329. Ibid.
330. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 872, 873 (1870).
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ceeds of life insurance upon the life of the decedent, by judicial
decision, do not fall under administration unless the succession
is made the beneficiary.33' The rule represents a recognition
that one of the basic motives for taking life insurance is the
desire to provide the family with money immediately upon the
death of the policy holder. The source of the Louisiana rule ap-
pears to be the Anglo-American law.38 2 The widow's share of
the marital community falls under administration in Louisiana
if the deceased husband's succession is administered.33 This ar-
rangement appears to have been made because it was considered
impractical for the succession representative to administer
property in indivision.
A substantial inter vivos gift made by the decedent to his
child is presumed in the Anglo-American law to be an advance-
ment.3 34 The presumption may be rebutted by parol evidence.3 35
If it is not established that a gift is not an advancement, the
child cannot share in the estate unless he returns the property
given him to the estate or agrees to permit his interest in the
estate to be diminished by the value of the gift.3 6 This real or
fictitious return to the estate of property given the child is
called "bringing into hotchpot."3 37
In the French law and Louisiana law it is presumed that the
donor of an inter vivos gift 338 made to a forced heir in the de-
scending line intended the gift should be subject to collation.8 9
331. See Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942) ; Succession
of Bofenschen, 29 La. Ann. 711 (1877) ; Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326
(1874).
332. See note 331 supra.
333. See Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 155 F.2d
310 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Succession of Bertrand, 123 La. 784, 49 So. 524 (1909).
334. See ATKINSON, WILLS § 129 (2d ed. 1953) ; RICHIE, ALFORD & EFFLAIND,
DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTs 60 (1955).
335. See note 334 supra.
336. See note 334 supra.
.337. See note 334 supra.
338. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1231, 1235 (1870). It was first held that,
under these articles, testamentary gifts, as well as donations inter vivos, were
subject to collation. See Succession of Williams, 132 La. 865, 61 So. 852 (1913) ;
Succession Of Ford, 130 La. 442, 58 So. 141 (1912). However, these cases were
later overruled, it being held that the articles cited were faultily drafted and
that collation. applied only to inter vivos gifts. See Doll v. Doll, 206 La. 550, 19
So. 2d.249 (1944) ; Succession of Meyer, 198 La. 53, 3 So. 2d 273 (1941) ; Jordan
v. Filmore, 167 La. 725, 120 So. 275 (1929). A similar problem arose because
of the improper drafting of article 843 of the Code Napoleon, which seemed to
indicate that donations mortis causa were subject to collation. Article 843 was
amended in 1898 so that it would become clear that collation applied only to dona-
tions inter vivos. See Jordan v. Filmore, supra; Comment, 26 TUL. L. REV. 203
(1953).
339. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1227-1230, 1235, 1236, 1244, 1245 (1870) ; FRENCH
19.63]
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This presumption may be rebutted by the affirmative statements
of the donor.3 40 Any forced heir in the descending line may
bring an action for collation if he has accepted the succession
or claimed the benefit of inventory. 341 The forced' heir can ex-
empt himself from collation by renouncing the succession.842
Collation may be made by returning the actual gift to the mass
of the succession or by fictitiously returning the gift and per-
mitting the donee's share of the succession to be reduced by the
amount of the gift.3 43 The concepts of hotchpot and collation
are much alike. The Louisiana courts had no reason, so far as
the effect of the systems was concerned, to abandon the rules of
collation and to adopt the rules of hotchpot. Although confusion
might have arisen as a result of the similarity of the systems,
confusion did not arise. Perhaps the concepts are too similar to
be confused.
Statutes have been enacted in most Anglo-American jurisdic-
tions that set forth grounds for the disqualification of executors
and administrators.3 44 The courts tend to enforce these statutes
more rigorously upon the administrator than upon the executor
because the executor is chosen by the decedent.3 45 In Louisiana
law, before the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, there
were no grounds in code or statute for the disqualification of the
succession representative. 346 An early case involving the point
held that the succession representative was not disqualified un-
less he was one whom the law declared infamous.347 The Code
of Civil Procedure sets forth grounds for the disqualification of
the succession representative in the manner of statutes in Anglo-
CIVIL CODE arts. 843, 852, 857; Succession of Anderson, 231 La. 195, 91 So. 2d 8
(1956) ; Succession of Gomez, 223 La. 859, 67 So. 2d 156 (1953) ; Doll v. Doll,
206 La. 550, 19 So. 2d 249 (1944) ; Champagne v. Champagne, 125 La. 408, 51
So. 440 (1910) ; Montgomery v. Chaney, 13 La. Ann. 207 (1858).
340. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1232, 1233 (1870) ; Gonsoulin v. Gonsoulin,
138 La. 941, 70 So. 919 (1916) ; Doll v. Doll, 206 La. 550, 19 So. 2d 249 (1944) ;
Darby v. Darby, 118 La. 328, 42 So. 953 (1907) ; Succession of Weber, 110 La.
674, 34 So. 731 (1901) ; Montgomery v. Chaney, 13 La. Ann. 207 (1858) ; of.
FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 919.
341. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1228, 1235 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts.
843, 857.
342. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1237 (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 845.
343. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1242, 1251-1288 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE
arts. 850, 858-868; Succession of Gomez, 223 La. 859, 67 So. 2d 156 (1953);
In re Andrus, 221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952).
344. See In re Will of Cohen, 164 Misc. 98, 298 N.Y. Supp. 368 (1937);
ATKINSON, WILLS §§ 108, 110, 111 (2d ed. 1953); SIMES & FRATCHEB, Fwu-
CIARY ADMINISTRATION 100, 101, n.24 (2d ed. 1956).
345. See note 344 supra.
346. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3097 (1960).
347. See Rust v. Randolph, 5 Mart.(O.S.) 89 (La. 1817).
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American jurisdictions. 848  The adoption of code grounds for
disqualification gives greater protection to the creditor; the
adoption was brought about by the growing awareness of the
commercial nature of Louisiana society.
In all Anglo-American states an order of priority in coming
to the administration is set forth by statute.8 49 The Louisiana
Civil Code of 1808 did not contain an order of priority because
all beneficiary heirs administered the succession.8 0 In the Civil
Codes of 1825 and 1870 and in the Code of Civil Procedure, an
order or priority in the selection of the administrator is given.8 'I
An order of priority appears to have been introduced into the
Civil Code of 1825 because it was necessary to provide an order
of priority in coming to the administration if there was to be a
judicially appointed administrator.3 52
Letters of administration or letters testamentary are issued
to the personal representative upon his appointment by the court
in the Anglo-American law.85 3 Although in Louisiana no pro-
vision in code or statute directed the issuance of letters testa-
mentary or letters of administration, 54 their issuance became a
348. See IA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3097 (1960) ; cf. SIMES, MODEL
PROBATE CODE § 96(6) (1946).
349. ATKINSON, WILLS § 109 (2d ed. 1953); SIMES & FRATCHER, FIDUCIARY
ADMINISTRATION 95-97 (2d ed. 1956).
350. See La. Civil Code art. 104, p. 168 (1808).
351. See La. Civil Code arts. 1035-1039 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1042-
1046 (1870) ; LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3098 (1960). The trial judge,
within the members of the same class, was given rather broad discretion in the
selection of an administrator. See Succession of Brown, 214 La. 377, 37 So. 2d
842 (1948) ; Succession of Eberle, 155 La. 603, 99 So. 464 (1924) ; Succession
of Gaines, 42 La. Ann. 699, 7 So. 788 (1890) ; Succession of Boudreaux, 42 La.
Ann. 296, 7 So. 453 (1890) ; Succession of Chaler, 39 La. Ann. 308, 1 So. 820
(1887) ; Succession of Martin, 13 La. Ann. 557 (1858) ; cf. Succession of Beraud,
21 La. Ann. 666 (1869). He could not, however, prefer someone of an inferior
class. See Succession of Virgets, 182 La. 491, 162 So. 53 (1935) ; Succession of
Rabe, 163 La. 149, 111 So. 658 (1927) ; Succession of Bulliard, 111 La. 186, 35
So. 508 (1903) ; Succession of Romero, 42 La. Ann. 894, 8 So. 632 (1890);
Succession of Picard, 33 La. Ann. 1135 (1881) ; Succession of Sloane, 12 La.
Ann. 610 (1857) ; Succession of Penney, 10 La. Ann. 290 (1855) ; Succession of
Petit, 9 La. Ann. 207 (1854) ; Succession of Eugene, 10 La. App. 294 (Orl. Cir.
1929); cf. Succession of Barber, 52 La. Ann. 957, 27 So. 361 (1900) ; Succes-
sion of Kalish, 143 So. 524 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932). These rules were, by judi-
cial decision, made applicable in the selection of the dative executor (the executor
whom the court appoints if no executor is appointed by will or if the executor
appointed by will is discharged or is unwilling or unable to serve). See Succes-
sion of Kneipp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931) ; Succession of Gusman, 36 La.
Ann. 299 (1884) ; Girod's Heirs and Legatees v. Girod's Executors, 18 La. Ann.
394 (1841) ; cf. SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 96(a) (1946).
352. See La. Civil Code art. 1034 (1825).
353. See ATKINSON, WILLS §§ 112, 113 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as
ATKINSON].
354. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3159 (1960).
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universal practice.3 5 5 The possession of letters of administra-
tion or letters testamentary was necessary for the transaction
of business in a land of "strangers." The Code of Civil Pro-
cedure gives express authority to the courts to issue letters
testamentary or letters of administration.3 56
In the Anglo-American law the personal representative is
required to bring actions necessary for the estate and to defend
actions brought against the estate. 357 Formerly, in Louisiana,
although the executor or administrator was required to collect
succession assets and to exercise the full power of a litigant,358
the executor was not permitted to bring real actions unless he
was joined by the heirs and legatees.- 9 This limitation upon the
power of the executor to stand as litigant was imposed as an
expression of the attitude of the planter, who, in this case, per-
mitted his feudal relationship to the soil to affect the civil law.
Feudal feeling now having vanished, the Code of Civil Procedure
required both the executor and the administrator to collect all
succession assets and to exercise the full powers of a litigant.3 60
An administrator or an executor can sell personalty either at
public auction or at private sale in the Anglo-American law.s61
In the original Louisiana law the personal representative could
sell movables and immovables at public auction upon his obtain-
ing an order of court.3 62 The private sale of succession assets
355. Ibid.; LOUISIANA FORMULARY ANNOTATED, form 709 (1951).
356. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3159 (1960).
357. See ATKINSON, §§ 116, 117, 127, 144; SIMES & FRATCIIER, FIDUCIARY
ADMINISTRATION 149-92 (2d ed. 1956).
358. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1049 (1870) ; La. Code of Practice arts. 122,
123 (1870) ; St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947) ;
Succession of Ott, 182 La. 850, 162 So. 642 (1939) ; Martin v. Himel, 174 La.
281, 140 So. 478 (1932) ; Succession of Gragard, 106 La. 298, 30 So. 885 (1901) ;
Succession of Coco, 32 La. Ann. 325 (1880) ; Succession of Decuir, 22 La. Ann.
371 (1870) ; Succession of Pool, 14 La. Ann. 677 (1859) ; Pauline v. Hubert, 14
La. Ann. 161 (1859) ; Meissonier v. Laurent, 14 La. Ann. 14 (1859) ; Longbot-
tom's Executors v. Babcock, 9 La. 44 (1836).
359. See La. Code of Practice art. 123 (1870) ; Woodward v. Thomas, 38 La.
Ann. 238 (1886). The rule, though preserved, was very loosely applied in two
later cases. See Jones v. Jones, 236 La. 52, 106 So. 2d 713 (1958) ; Gregory v.
Hardwick, 218 La. 346, 49 So. 2d 423 (1950). The rule was applied only to the
executor; it never applied to the administrator. See Succession of Williams V.
Chaplain, 112 La. 1075, 36 So. 859 (1904) ; Woodward v. Thomas, supra; Heirs
of Guillotte v. City of Lafayette, 5 La. Ann. 382 (1850).
360. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3191, 3196, 3198 (1960).
361. See ATKINSON, § 122. Statutes in all states except Virginia give the
personal representative the power to sell realty upon obtaining an order of
court, but only to pay debts. Even in the absence of statutory authority, the
testamentary executor may be given the power to sell realty by will. Id. if 123,
124. 1 '". : i
362. See La. Civil Code arts. 105, p. 168, 128, p. 174, 173-174, p. 246 (1808);
Vidrine v. Deshotels, 181 La. 50, 158 So. 618 (1935) ; Bender v. Bailey, 130 La.
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was not permitted. By legislative enactment, the private sale
came gradually to be permitted as a recognition of a more com-
mercial and more urban society in which the public auction drew
little attention. The adoption of the private sale was delayed,
undoubtedly, by the illegal and fraudulent use of the private
sale in the Reconstruction era.363 In 1890 an act was passed per-
mitting the succession representative to sell stocks and bonds
on the open market.3 64 It is significant that the succession
assets first permitted to be sold at private sale were stocks and
bonds, assets which had no connotation of feudal power. In
1934, in an attempt to meet conditions caused by the depression,
the legislature enacted a statute permitting the succession rep-
resentative to make a dation en paiement of mortgaged succes-
sion property to the mortgagee in cancellation of the indebted-
ness if the value of the property was less than the amount of the
debt.3 65 Throughout the period from the adoption of the Civil
Code of 1808 until 1938, immovable succession property could
be sold only after all movable property had been sold.3 6  This
requirement that movable property be sold first, though not a
manifestation of the feudal attitude that land was not a form
of wealth, was a manifestation of the planter's attitude that land
was the principal form of wealth. By 1938 the increased impor-
tance of intangible movable property had caused Louisianians
to see that land was not the principal form of wealth. A statute
was enacted that permitted all succession property to be sold at
private sale and immovable property to be sold concurrently
with movable property if the sale was private. 67 In the Code
of Civil Procedure both private3 18 and public sales869 are per-
mitted and the rule permitting the concurrent sale of movable
property and immovable property is applied to both public and
private sales.3 70
In the Anglo-American law the personal representative can-
not buy property of the decedent's estate or buy the interest the
841, 57 So. 998 (1912) ; Heirs of Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. .73, 16 So. 507
(1895) ; Succession of Townsend v. Sykes, 38 La. Ann. 859 (1886) ; Succession
of Harris, 29 La. Ann. 743 (1877) ; Succession of Winn, 27 La. Ann. 687 (1875);
Ballio v. Wilson, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 344 (La. 1829).
363. See Heirs of Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 73, 16 So. 507 (1895).
364. See La. Acts 1890, No. 21. Stocks and bonds were to be sold at the rates
prevailing on the open market.
365. See La. Acts 1934, No. 121.
366. See La. Civil Code arts. 105, p. 168, 128, p. 174, 173-174, p.!246 (1808).
367. See La. Acts 1938, No. 290. .
368. See LA. CODE OF CiVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3281-3285 (1960).
369. See id. arts. 3271-3273.,
370.-See id. art. 3262
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heirs, legatees, devisees, or distributees have in the estate,37' even
through an intervening party.372 These actions are considered
to constitute a breach of the fiduciary's duty of loyalty.3 73 Sales
made in this manner are not void but voidable. They may be
ratified by all parties in interest.374 In Louisiana before the
adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure a personal representa-
tive could not buy succession property either in his own name
or through the medium of a third party,875 except in certain
cases.3 7 6 The sale, however, was not void but voidable and it
could be ratified by all parties in interest, as it could in the
Anglo-American law.877 Although these rules were similar to
the Anglo-American rules, they were derived from French
sources.3 78 An important exception to the Louisiana rule forbid-
ding sales of this type was developed as the result of a misstate-
ment of the Anglo-American law in a case decided by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. In Michoud v. Girod379 the
Court stated in dicta that if a fiduciary bought the whole inter-
est of the beneficiary, under the law of equity the fiduciary re-
lationship was terminated and the sale was valid without rati-
fication. The Louisiana courts, following the dicta in Michoud
v. Girod, held in two cases that if an executor or administrator
purchased the whole interest of the heir or legatee, the sale was
valid without ratification.380 The Code of Civil Procedure pro-
hibits contracts between the personal representative and the suc-
cession and sales of succession property or interests in succes-
sion property to the personal representative.38 ' The rule devel-
oped upon the incorrect dicta in Michoud v. Girod appears to
have been eliminated from Louisiana law.
Beyond the power of sale no specific contractual powers or
371. See Davis v. Jenkins, 236 N.C. 283, 72 S.E.2d 673 (1952); ATKINSON,
§ 122.
372. ATKINSON, § 122.
373. Ibid.
374. Ibid.
375. See La. Civil Code arts. 1139, 1784 (1825) ; Heirs of Wood v. Nicholls,
33 La. Ann. 744 (1881) ; Prothro v. Prothro, 33 La. Ann. 598 (1881) ; Collins
v. Hollier, 13 La. Ann. 585 (1858) ; Longbottom's Executors v. Babcock, 9 La.
44 (1836).
376. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1146 (1870).
377. See Prothro v. Prothro, 33 La. Ann. 598 (1881) ; Heirs of Wood v.
Nicholls, 33 La. Ann. 744 (1881).
378. See note 377 supra.
379. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503 (1846).
380. See Ross v. Ross, 3 La. Ann. 533 (1848) ; Crow v. Griffin, 6 La. Ann.
316 (1851).
381. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3194 (1960). The exceptions con-
tained in LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1146 (1870) are preserved, however. See LA. CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3195 (1960).
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duties were given the succession representative by the provisions
of the French codes or by the provisions of the several codes in
force in Louisiana before the Code of Civil Procedure was adopt-
ed. The contractual actions of the succession representative were
governed in the Louisiana code provisions only by the prudent
man rule.3 8 2 The French doctrinal writers are in conflict as to
the specific contractual powers and duties of the executor38 and
the beneficiary heir who administers.38 The Louisiana law and
the French law, in this respect, were inadequately adjusted to a
commercial society. Louisiana was forced to turn to the Anglo-
American law for most of its rules concerning the contractual
powers and duties of the administrator and the executor.
In the Anglo-American law the personal representative has
the power and is under the duty to enter into all contracts neces-
sary to preserve the estate.8 5 Contracts of the succession rep-
resentative do not bind the estate86 but the succession repre-
sentative is entitled to be compensated for all necessary ex-
penses.38 7 If the executor enters into a contract that specifically
states he is given the power under the will to bind the estate
directly by such contracts, and provides that the estate is to be
directly bound, the estate is directly bound if the statement con-
tained in the contract is correct. The executor is personally lia-
ble for breach of warranty if the statement is untrue.388 No
specific Louisiana code provision gave the personal representa-
tive power to enter into contracts for the preservation of suc-
cession property. The Louisiana courts, in adjusting to a com-
mercial society, permitted the personal representative to be com-
pensated for expenses incurred directly for the benefit of the
succession,38 although they did not permit him to bind the suc-
382. See La. Civil Code arts. 52, p. 68, 135, p. 176 (1808).
383. Cf. 10 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET COLIN, TRAITIt DE DROIT CIVIL n** 2634-
2647 (3d ed. 1905) ; 5 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DES DONATIONS n° 65 (1880); 14
LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS n°- 352-358 (1880) ; 4 MARCADA,
EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL n ° 148 (7th ed. 1873).
384. Cf. 7 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET COLIN, TRAITt DE DRorT CIVIL n ° 1336
(3d ed. 1905) ; 2 DALLOZ, CODE ANNOTtS (NOUVEAU CODE CIVIL) art. 803, n 37
(1911) ; 3 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITIt DES SUCCESSIONS n° 228 (1879) ; 4 TOULLIER, LE
DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS n0 373-395 (6th ed. 1846-48).
385. See ATKINSON, §§ 118, 119; SIMES & FRATCHER, FIDUCIARY ADMINIS-
TRATION 150 (2d ed. 1956).
386. See Call v. Garland, 124 Me. 27, 125 Atl. 225 (1924) ; ATKINSON, § 119.
387. See note 386 supra.
388. See note 386 supra.
389. See Succession of Wood, 186 La. 181, 171 So. 843 (1937); Succession
of Rhodes, 164 La. 488, 114 So. 107 (1927) ; Succession of Dorville, 30 La. Ann.
133 (1878) ; Succession of Henderson, 24 La. Ann. 435 (1872); Succession of
Macarty, 3 La. Ann. 517 (1848) ; Succession of Whitehead, 3 La. Ann. 396
(1848).
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cession directly.890 No case that involved a contract stating that
the executor had been given the power to bind the succession
directly ever arose. It is not known whether the Louisiana
courts would have adopted the Anglo-American refinements of
the rule; if presented with an appropriate case. In the Code of
Civil Procedure, the succession representative is given the power
and is placed under the duty to enter into contracts to preserve
the succession.391 The Code makes no mention of what is to be
done if the contract states that the succession is to be bound
directly. Refinements contained in the rules of other legal sys-
tems are often removed when these rules are adopted.
In the Anglo-American law the executor or administrator
may continue the business of the decedent temporarily.3 92 He is
not permitted to continue to operate a business indefinitely un-
less he is given this power by will or by judicial order. If he
continues to operate a business for an indefinite time without
authority, he is personally liable for the losses sustained as a
result of his actions. 3 93 Before the Code of Civil Procedure was
adopted, no code authority existed in Louisiana for continuing
the operation of a business. The Louisiana courts, obviously in-
fluenced by the Anglo-American rule permitting a temporary
continuation of business, held that the personal representative
could continue the cultivation of a growing crop.394 However,
no decision permitted the temporary operation of other types of
business or upheld the validity of a judicial authorization of
the continued operation of a business.39 5 The executor or admin-
istrator was personally liable for the losses sustained if he con-
tinued the business for an indefinite period of time.396 The Code-
of Civil Procedure, influenced by the Anglo-American law, gives
390. See Hoss v. Jones, 26 La. Ann. 659 (1874) ; Landry v. Delas, Lorio &
Co., 25 La. Ann. 181 (1873) ; Carroll, Hoy & Co. v. Davidson, 23 La. Ann. 428
(1871) ; Livingston v. Gaussen, 21 La. Ann. 286 (1869) ; Dean v. Wade, 8 La.'
Ann. 85 (1853.) ; cf. Succession of Nitch, 22 La. Ann. 316 (1870).
391. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3191, 3221 (1960).
392. See Hardy & Co. v. Turnage, 204 N.C. 538, 168 S.E. 823 (1933) ; ATIN-
soN , § 121. .. . ..
393. See Beneux v. Brown Shoe Co., 191 Ark. 579, 87 S.W.2d 28 (1935)
Hines v. Levers & Sargent Co.,' 226 Mass. 214, 115 N.E. 252 (1917) ; ATKINSON,:
J 121. ..
394. See Succession of Worley, 40 La. Ann. 622, 4 So. 570 (1888) Succes-
sion of Wederstrandt, 19 La. Ann. 494 (1867).
395. See McMahon, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1
(1960).
396. See Succession of Huxen, 149 La. 61, 88 So. 687 (1921); Maxwell-
Yerger Co. v; Rogan, 125 La. 1, 51 So. 48 (1910) ; Wiemann v. Mainegra, 112 La.
305, 36 So. 358 (1904); Florsheim Bros. v. Holt, 32 La. Ann. 133 (1880);
Carroll, Hoy & Co. v. Davidson, 23 La. Ann. 428 (1871) ; Miltenberger v. Taylor,
23 La. Ann. 188 (1871).
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authority to the courts to order the continuation of business
during the period of administration. 39 7
In most situations Anglo-American law does not permit the
succession representative to invest succession assets 9sM  Before
the Code of Civil Procedure was adopted, it was thought that in
Louisiana the succession representative could not invest succes-
sion assets,399 although there were no cases clearly so holding.40°
The Code of Civil Procedure permits the succession representa-
tive to invest succession funds in securities included in a manda-
tory legal list upon obtaining judicial authorization. 40 1
It is considered improper in the Anglo-American law to de-
posit succession funds in a bank for an indefinite time,40 2 be-
cause deposits of succession funds for an indefinite time are con-
sidered to be loans without security.40 3 Since the adoption of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act the courts and legislatures of
other states have been more willing to permit the deposit of
succession funds for an indefinite period.40 4 Originally in Lou-
isiana no code provision permitted or required the deposit of
succession funds. However, in 1837 a statute was enacted that
made it the duty of the succession representative to deposit all
succession funds in a bank,40 5 and provided a penalty of twenty
percent per annum for failure to do S0.406 The adoption of this
statute illustrates the spirit of Louisiana legal thought at the
time. In the Anglo-American states the permanent deposit of
succession funds was then considered improper ;407 in Louisiana
397. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3224, 3225 (1960).
398. See In re Estate of Marchildon, 188 Minn. 38, 246 N.W. 676 (1933);
ATKINSON, §§ 124, 125.
399. See LA. CODE OF' CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3222 (1960).
400. In Succession of Conery, 111 La. 113, 35 So. 479 (1903) and Succession
of Sprowl, 21 La. Ann. 544 (1869), it was stated that the succession representa-
tive was not permitted to make investments. However, the holding of Succession
of Sprowl, supra, is very weak because the "investments" involved were Confed-
erate notes and the court was a Reconstruction court. The statement in Succes-
sion of Conery, supra, is merely dicta.
401. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3222 (1960); LA. R.S. 9:2061,(1950).
402. See In re Estate of Wood, 159 Cal. 466, 114 Pac. 992 (1911) ; ATKIN-
SON, § 124; SIMES & FRATCHER, FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION 215, 216, n. 9 (2d
ed. 1956).
403. See ATKINSON, § 124; SIMES & FRACICER, FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION
215, 216 n. 9 (2d ed. 1956).
404. See note 403 supra; RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 180, comment d, § 227,
comment i (Supp. 1948).
405. See La. Acts 1837, No. 102.
406. Ibid.
407. See SIMES & FRATCHER, FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION 215, 216, n. 9 (2d
ed. 1956).
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the permanent deposit of succession funds was not only permit-
ted, but required. Strangely enough, several months after the
passage of this act the financial crisis of 1837 struck ;408 many
banks failed ;409 yet the statute was not repealed.410 In 1838 a
banking law was passed by the legislature but vetoed by the
Governor. The legislature failed to override his veto.41' The
failure of the legislature to repeal the statute requiring the de-
posit of succession funds and its inability to enact the banking
law show the magnitude of the political power wielded by the
banks. In 1841 and 1842, the legislature enacted strong banking
laws that made Louisiana banks the safest in the country.
41 2 It
is strange that the Jacksonian cotton farmers did not compel
the repeal of the statute requiring the permanent deposit of
succession funds when they acquired substantial political
power under the Constitution of 1845. However, the banks
continued to be very powerful politically, 41 3 and the legislatures
that met under this Constitution were not so strongly agrarian
as the Constitutional Convention had been.414 The statute was
never repealed. It is incorporated in the Code of Civil Proce-
dure.415
The courts held alternately that the imposition of the pen-
alty for failure to deposit succession funds in banks was manda-
tory and that it was discretionary. The cases fall into a chron-
ological arrangement that bears a relationship to the events of
Louisiana history. In the only case decided in the period from
1837 to 1845, the penalty was rigidly applied because the sugar
planter-New Orleans merchant coalition was in full control of
the state.416 In the period between 1845 and 1852, the anti-com-
mercial small cotton farmers were in partial control of the state.
However, the occupants of the bench did not respond to a politi-
cal change incomplete and of short duration. The only case in
this period applied the penalty as mandatory.417 The planter-mer-
chant alliance was in complete control of the state between 1852
and 1860. The penalty was applied in the only case decided in
408. See Succession of Christy, 6 La. Ann. 427 (1851).
409. Ibid.
410. Ibid.
411. See CALDWELL, A BANKING HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 62 (1935); STAN-
DARD HISTORY OF NEW ORLEANS 597 (Rightor ed. 1900).
412. See DAVIS, LOUISIANA: THE PELICAN STATE 179 (1959).
413. See 4 GAYARRE, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 660 (3d ed. 1885).
414. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 130-31 (1939).
415. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3222 (1960).
416. See Succession of Peytavin, 7 Rob. 477 (La. 1844).
417. See Depas v. Riez, 2 La. Ann. 30 (1847).
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this period.41 8 No cases upon the point arose in the Reconstruc-
tion era. It would be thought that the penalty would have been
applied strictly at the end of the Reconstruction era because the
merchant-planter alliance was again in control of the state. The
banks in this period were not unsound.419 However, many plan-
tations had been seized by the banks in the Reconstruction
era.420 There must have been a strong feeling of resentment
toward the bankers among the planters. Furthermore, it was
in the post-Reconstruction era, 1877-1900, that Louisiana was
most in sympathy with the rest of the South, which was pre-
dominantly anti-commercial. In this period the courts consid-
ered the application of the penalty to be discretionary. 421 After
1900 Louisiana identified itself less strongly with the rest of
the South because memories of the Civil War and the Recon-
struction era were becoming less vivid. The merchant-planter
coalition was still in power. The courts in the period between
1900 and 1928 applied the penalty rigidly.422 In 1928 Huey Long
was elected Governor and the merchant-planter coalition lost
control of the state. In this era it is not surprising that the pen-
alty for failure to make bank deposits of succession funds was
considered to be discretionary. 423 However, the anti-commercial
features of the Long regime disappeared with the assassination
of Huey Long in 1935. Trust estates, forbidden by the legislature
as part of the "Share Our Wealth" program in 1935, were again
permitted by act of the legislature in 1938.424 Yet, in judicial
decisions rendered after 1938425 and in the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure,426 the penalty was considered to be discretionary. Al-
though commercialism was again the dominant force in Louisi-
ana politics, the privileged coalition of New Orleans merchant
and sugar planter no longer controlled the state.
The succession representative in the Anglo-American law is
under a duty to perform executory contracts if the contracts are
418. See Reed v. Crocker, 12 La. Ann. 445 (1857).
419. See SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 250-51 (1939).
420. Id. at 24849.
421. See Succession of Barrett, 43 La. Ann. 61, 8 So. 438 (1891) ; Succes-
sion of Sparrow, 39 La. Ann. 696, 2 So. 501 (1887) ; Congregation v. Farrelly,
34 La. Ann. 533 (1882) ; Succession of Boutte, 32 La. Ann. 556 (1880).
422. Boone v. Boone, 152 La. 208, 92 So. 861 (1922); In re Dimmick's Estate,
111 La. 655, 35 So. 801 (1903).
423. See Succession of Gandolfo, 173 La. 190, 136 So. 561 (1931).
424. See Depas v. Riez, 2 La. Ann. 30 (1847).
425. See Succession of Baronet, 222 La. 1051, 64 So. 2d 428 (1953) ; Succes-
sion of David, 213 La. 707, 35 So. 2d 465 (1948) ; Succession of Lombardo, 204
La. 429, 15 So. 2d 813 (1943).
426. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3222 (1960).
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beneficial to the estate,427 to break executory contracts if they
are detrimental to the estate.48 He is not expected to perform
contracts involving a unique personal contribution.42 He is
under a duty to perform partially completed building con-
tracts. 480 In Louisiana under the former law no cases arose
that concerned performance of executory contracts by the suc-
cession representative. However, the Code of Civil Procedure,
imitating the Model Probate Code, provides that the succession
representative may perform executory contracts evidenced by
writing upon obtaining an order of court.431 This provision
shows a partial adjustment to a commercial society.
Both the Anglo-American 432 and the Louisiana law require
the personal representative to close the affairs of the succession
as quickly as possible. This rule was never expressly stated in
Louisiana code provisions. Rather, it was taken by inference43 3
from the code rule (which was not strictly followed) 434 that the
executor would have seizin for only a year.43 1 This rule requir-
ing the succession representative to close the succession as
quickly as possible reflects the popular feeling that the owner
of property should control its use. The rule is now stated in the
Code of Civil Procedure.43 6
In most Anglo-American jurisdictions the running of the
statute of limitations upon debts continues although the claim
of the decedent's creditor is acknowledged by the personal rep-
resentative.4 37 There were no provisions in the Louisiana Codes
of 1808, 1825, or 1870 permitting the running of prescription
to be stopped during administration. However, the Louisiana
courts held that if a personal represntative acknowledged the
claim of the creditor the running of prescription was suspended
for the term of the administration. 438 This rule was more ap-
427. See In re Estate of Burke, 198 Cal. 163, 244 Pac. 340 (1926) ; ATKIN-
SON, WILLS § 120 (2d ed. 1933).
428. See note 427 supra.
429. See note 427 supra.
430. See note 427 supra.
431. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3227 (1960).
432. See SIMES & FRATCHIER, FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION 4-6 (2d ed. 1956).
433. See Furguson v. Glaze, 12 La. Ann. 667 (1856) ; Michot v. Flotte's
Adm'x, 12 La. 129 (1838) ; Taylor v. Jeffries' Estate, 10 La. 435 (1836).
434. See note 433 supra.
435. See LA. CIvI CODE art. 1659 (1870).
436. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3197 (1960).
437. See ATKINSON, WILLS § 127 (2d ed. 1953).
438. The more recent view was that the running of prescription was suspend-
ed, that is, that prescription did not run during the term of administration, but
that it started running at the point at which it had stopped when the adminis-
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propriate for a commercial society than the Anglo-American
rule. In a commercial society the creditor must be able to rely
upon an acknowledgment of a debt by the personal representa-
tive. The rule is included in the Code of Civil Procedure.43 9
The personal representative is required to obtain a judicial
order before paying the debts of the estate in the Anglo-Ameri-
can law. 44  In Louisiana under the former code provisions the
personal representative could not pay the debts of the succes-
sion until he had filed a tableau of distribution (a proposed
schedule of the payment of debts) and given public notice of his
filing by advertisement and until the tableau had been homol-
ogated by the court.441 Under the Code of Civil Procedure the
same requirements are made 442 and an additional requirement is
instituted. The personal representative is required to mail a
notice of the filing of the tableau to any person who has peti-
tioned the court for notice. 443 This provision is intended to offer
the creditor an additional protection.444 However, in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 445 it was held that to satis-
fy due process requirements the best possible notice must be
given interested parties and that with respect to nonresidents
whose addresses are known notice must be given by mail. Ob-
viously, the Louisiana law was modified in an attempt to make
it conform to the principles of the Mullane case. However, it
does not appear that the degree of conformity is sufficient to
satisfy constitutional requirements.
tration was concluded. See Morris v. Executors of Cain, 39 La. Ann. 712, 2 So.
418 (1887) ; Succession of Mansion, 34 La. Ann. 1246 (1882) ; Renshaw v. Staf-
ford, 30 La. Ann. 853 (1878). However, many cases held that the running of
prescription was interrupted, that is, that the accumulated prescriptive term was
erased and that prescription started running anew immediately. Succession of
Richmond, 35 La. Ann. 858 (1883); Maraist v. Guilbeau, 31 La. Ann. 713
(1879) ; Sevier v. Succession of Gordon, 21 La. Ann. 373 (1869) ; Succession of
Yarborough, 16 La. Ann. 258 (1861) ; Succession of Dubreuil, 12 Rob. 507 (La.
1846). Succession of Dubreuil, supra, is particularly interesting because the court
first held that acknowledgment by the personal representative suspended prescrip-
tion but then, on rehearing, held that it interrupted prescription.
439. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3243 (1960). The article cited
takes the position that an acknowledgment of a creditor's claim by a succession
representative suspends prescription. However, in the comment that follows the
redactors state that the acknowledgment interrupts prescription.
440. See ATKINSON, WILLS §§ 127, 143 (2d ed. 1953).
441. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1063-1066, 1180, 1181, 1184, 1186 (1870) ; Suc-
cession of Conrad, 45 La. Ann. 89, 1 So. 935 (1893) ; Succession of Boug~re, 29
La. Ann. 378 (1877) ; Depas v. Riez, 2 La. Ann. 30 (1847) ; Millaudon v. Cajus,
6 La. 222 (1834).
442. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3301, 3303, 3304, 3307 (1960).
443. See id. arts. 3305, 3306.
444. See id. art. 3306.
445. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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In Anglo-American law the personal representative is re-
quired to file an annual account.446 In Louisiana law, originally,
the succession representative was required to file an annual ac-
count as his counterpart was in the Anglo-American law. 447 In
1837, at the time the statute requiring the deposit of succession
funds in banks was adopted, a supplementary provision was
enacted requiring the succession representative to file an ac-
count at any time upon demand by any interested party.
448 If
the succession representative failed to file an account upon be-
ing ordered to do so by the court, he was subject to removal and
a penalty of ten percent per annum. 449 The requirement that an
account be filed annually was contained in the Civil Code of
1870,450 but it lost all meaning because no penalty was exacted
for failure to file. 45 1 Both the filing of an account annually and
the filing of an account upon the motion of an interested party
are required in the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 2 It is possible
that the courts will continue to disregard the rule requiring the
filing of an annual account. The adoption of the requirement
that an account be filed upon the motion of any interested party
discouraged fraudulent action on the part of the succession rep-
resentative. Fraudulent action could not be easily concealed if
the succession representative could be called upon to account at
any time.
The executor or administrator is required by the Code of
Civil Procedure to file a final account and to serve copies upon
the heirs and legatees. 45 3 This requirement is taken from a judi-
cial interpretation of earlier code provisions. 45 4 Under the Code
446. See ATKINSON, WILLS § 142 (2d ed. 1953).
447. See La. Civil Code art. 173, p. 246 (1808).
448. See La. Acts 1837, No. 102. This act was incorporated into the Civil
Code of 1.870 as article 1151.
449. See La. Acts 1837, No. 102; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1151 (1870) ; Suc-
cession of Bertrand, 127 La. 857, 54 So. 127 (1911) ; Voinche v. Brouillette, 50
La. Ann. 370, 23 So. 318 (1898) ; Succession of Head, 28 La. Ann. 800 (1876) ;
Succession of Williams, 7 Rob. 46 (La. 1844) ; Overton v. Overton's Adm'r,
10 La. 472 (1836) ; cf. Reed v. Crocker, 12 La. Ann. 445 (1857).
450. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1191, 1674 (1870).
451. See Succession of Bertrand, 127 La. 857, 54 So. 127 (1911) ; Succession
of Head, 28 La. Ann. 800 (1876).
452. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3331 (1960).
453. See id. arts. 3332, 3335.
454. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1194 (1870) ; Landry v. Landry, 105 La. 362,
29 So. 900 (1901) ; Succession of Conrad, 45 La. Ann. 89, 11 So. 935 (1893) ;
Carter v. MeManus, 15 La. Ann. 676 (1860) ; Truxillo v. Truxillo, 11 La. Ann.
412 (1856) ; Bry v. Dowell, 1 Rob. 111 (La. 1841). The courts have often con-
fused the final account and the final tableau of distribution. See Landry v. Lan-
dry, supra, Millaudon v. Cajus, 6 La. Ann. 222 (1834) ; Succession of Conrad,
supra. For an excellent discussion distinguishing the final account and the final
tableau of distribution, see Succession of Bofenschen, 29 La. Ann. 711 (1877).
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of Civil Procedure the judgment homologating the final account
is prima facie evidence of the correctness of the account and of
the same effect as the final judgment in an ordinary action.455
Notice to creditors of the filing of the final account is not re-
quired.456 It therefore appears that the requirements of the
Mullane case are met neither in the notice required for filing of
the final account nor in the notice required for filing of the
tableau of distribution.
The executor or administrator in Anglo-Amercian law is per-
sonally liable for losses sustained as a result of his breach of
fiduciary duty.457 Also, he is liable for all losses that occur with
respect to property he purchased from the succession, property
he failed to earmark, or property the custody of which he im-
properly delegated, although no causal connection is shown be-
tween his improper action and the loss. 45 8 In Louisiana law the
executor or administrator is liable for damages that result from
his maladministration. 45 9 He was never made liable by code pro-
vision for injuries to the succession not resulting from his im-
proper action nor is he made liable by the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. However, in one case he was held liable for injuries to
succession property that he did not earmark, although the in-
juries were not caused by this failure.460 He is required to pay
a ten percent penalty for failure to file an account upon being
ordered to do so by the court,461 and a twenty percent penalty
for failure to deposit succession funds in a bank,462 even though
no loss occurs. The underlying basis for liability without causa-
tion in the Anglo-American law in situations involving the fail-
ure to earmark or the purchase of succession property is the
danger of fraudulent action by the succession representative.
One reason for making the personal representative liable in the
law of Louisiana for penalties of ten or twenty percent for fail-
ure to file an account or failure to deposit succession funds is to
455. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3337 (1960).
456. See id. arts. 3331-3338.
457. See SIMES & FRATCIER, FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION 158-60 (2d ed.
1956).
458. Ibid.
459. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3191 (1960) ; Succession of
Futch, 207 La. 807, 22 So. 2d 125 (1945) ; Succession of Coco, 32 La. Ann. 325
(1880) ; Succession of Boudousquie, 9 Rob. 405 (La. 1845) ; Longbottom's Execu-
tors v. Babcock, 9 La. 44 (1836).
460. Succession of Lagarde, 20 La. Ann. 148 (1868).
461. See La. Acts 1837, No. 102; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1151 (1870) LA.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3334 (1960).
462. See La. Acts 1837, No. 102; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1150 (1870); LA.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3222 (1960).
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reduce the possibility of fraudulent action. Thus, to some ex-
tent, liability without causation in the Anglo-American law and
liability without injury in the Louisiana law have the same
basis. However, the Louisiana rules concerning liability appear
to be more commercial in spirit than the Anglo-American rules.
The Anglo-American rules are drawn from the point of view of
the heirs, legatees, devisees, and distributees; the Louisiana
rules concerning the penalties of ten and twenty percent are
drawn principally from the point of view of the creditors and
the banking interests.
In Anglo-American law the executor or administrator may
be removed if he breaches a fiduciary duty, mismanages the
estate,46 3 or (under the statutes of many jurisdictions) leaves
the state and establishes residence elsewhere. 464 In Louisiana
under the former law the executor or administrator could be
removed for breach of fiduciary duty, mismanagment of the
estate, or failure to appoint an agent for service of process
after establishing domicile in another state.465 This rule is pre-
served in the Code of Civil Procedure.46 The purpose of the
rule in Louisiana and Anglo-Amercian law is to prevent con-
tinued mismanagement of the estate by the succession repre-
sentative.
The original policy of the Anglo-American law was to re-
quire the payment of debts out of personalty before they were
paid out of realty.46 7 In more recent Anglo-American law, with
some exceptions, devises and bequests of the same class abate
together.46 8 In the Louisiana law from the earliest times, debts
were paid from universal legacies of movables and immovables
and from legacies under universal title of movables and immov-
ables before they were paid from particular legacies. 469 Land
and personalty in this respect were accorded equal treatment.
Equal treatment of land and personalty in the matter of abate-
463. See ATKINSON, WILLS § 114 (2d ed. 1953).
464. Ibid.
465. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1158 (1870) ; of. Succession of Willis, 109 La.
281, 33 So. 314 (1903).
466. See LA. CODE OF Cvm PRocEDuRE art. 3682 (1960).
467. See ATKINSON, WILLS § 136 (2d ed. 1953) ; SIMES & FRATCHER, FiDU-
CIARY ADMINISTRA1ION 25-28 (2d ed. 1956).
468. See note 467 supra. In the absence of stated or presumed intent of the
testator, debts are first paid out of residuary bequests and devises, and then out
of specific bequests and devises.
469. See La. Civil Code arts. 125, p. 234, 137, p. 238 (1808) ; Pironi v. Riley,
39 La. Ann. 302, 1 So. 675 (1887) ; Eskridge v. Farrar, 30 La. Ann. 718 (1878) ;
Sarce v. Dunoyer's Executor, 11 La. 220 (1837) ; Aubry v. Caius, 8 La. 43(1835).
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ment was not provided in most Anglo-American jurisdictions
until rather recently. In 1808 the Louiisana law in this partic-
ular was more adjusted to a commercial society than the Anglo-
American law.
The concept of legitime, an ancient doctrine found in the
Roman law,470 has always been accepted in Louisiana. 47' Under
this concept children and other close relatives are considered to
be entitled to a certain proportion of the property of the dece-
dent, their legitime, which the decedent cannot alienate by do-
nation inter vivos or mortis causa.47 2 The concept of legitime
was in accord with the principles of the French Revolution,
which most of the French inhabitants of Louisiana espoused.
Louisiana, in providing for the legitime in the Civil Code of
1808, was both continuing an ancient civilian doctrine and ad-
hering to a revolutionary precept, that there should be equality
among the heirs.
The Louisiana rules concerning abatement of legacies in the
payment of debts are apparently based upon the supposed in-
tent of the testator. The former Anglo-American rules prefer-
ring realty to personalty in the payment of debts were similarly
based upon the supposed intent of the testator (to keep land in
the family) and also upon an end of public order (the keeping
of land in the same great families for centuries). However, in
Louisiana, an intent to impinge upon the legitime of the forced
heir is considered to be a violation of public order. Therefore,
the Louisiana law does not speculate as to what would be the
intent of the decedent if he knew that his inter vivos and testa-
mentary gifts would be set aside ;473 the universal legacies, the
legacies under universal title, and the particular legacies abate
ratably to satisfy the forced portion. 474
At any time during the course of administration the heirs
can, upon demand, be sent immediately into possession under a
470. See 9 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET COLIN, TRAiTk DE DROIT CIVIL n0* 652,
661 (3d ed. 1905) ; 5 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS n*1 97, 98 (6th ed.
1846-48). The principle of legitim was a part of various local customs in Eng-
land although it was not a part of "the custom of the realm." See PLUCKNETT,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 744 (5th ed. 1956).
471. See La. Civil Code art. 19, p. 212 (1808) ; Dainow, The Early Sources
of Forced Heirship, 4 LA. L. REV. 42 (1941).
472. See note 471 supra.
473. It does, however, recognize the testator's statement of what his intent
would be if a certain legacy was found to impinge upon the forced portion. See
La. Civil Code art. 34, p. 216 (1808).
474. See La. Civil Code art. 33, p. 216 (1808) ; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La.
237, 148 So. 37 (1933) ; Theall v. Theall's Legatees, 11 La. 429 (1837).
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rule developed by the courts475 (upon a code article affecting
executors) 476 and included in the Code of Civil Procedure. 471 If
the heirs are sent into immediate possession after administra-
tion has begun but before it has been completed they become
personally liable for the debts of the decedent just as they would
be if they had initially accepted the succession unconditionally
without administration. 478 No parallel doctrine can be found in
the Anglo-American law because there is no concept of uncondi-
tional acceptance. 479 The rule permitting the heirs to be sent
into possession at any moment during the course of administra-
tion was originally supported by the feudal attitudes of the
planters, by the anti-commercial views of the small farmers, and
by the general desire of the population to be free from judicial
restraint. Now only the desire to be free from judicial restraint
remains, but it is sufficiently strong to support the rule.
When the administration is concluded, in the Anglo-Amer-
ican law the personal representative files a statement setting
forth the proposed distributions to the heirs, devisees, legatees,
and distributees; the court renders a decree of distribution; and
the property is turned over to those who are entitled to it.4s0
The Louisiana rules concerning the final legal actions required
before the closing of the succession were found partly in the
Civil Code and partly in judicial decisions before the Code of
Civil Procedure was adopted. Code rules provided for the fil-
ing of the final tableau of distribution and the final account.
41l
The courts developed rules providing for a judgment sending
the heirs into possession and for an order discharging the suc-
cession representative. 4 2 These code and judicial rules are now
to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure.
48 3
475. Berry v. Wagner, 151 La. 456, 91 So. 837 (1922) ; Succession of LeBlanc,
128 La. 1055, 55 So. 672 (1911) ; Barton v. Burbank, 114 La. 224, 38 So. 150
(1905); Succession of Charmbury, 34 La. Ann. 21 (1882) ; Soye v. Price, 30
La. Ann. 93 (1878) ; Sevier v. Sargent, 25 La. Ann. 220 (1873) ; cf. Succession
of Linton, 27 La. Ann. 351 (1875).
476. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1671 (1870).
477. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3362, 3372 (1960).
478. See Berry v. Wagner, 151 La. 456, 91 So. 837 (1022).
479. See ATKINSON, WILLS § 2 (2d ed. 1953).
480. Id. § 143.
481. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1063-1066, 1180, 1181, 1184, 1186, 1194 (1870).
482. Succession of Braun, 187 La. 185, 174 So. 257 (1937) ; Succession of
Taylor, 174 La. 822, 141 So. 847 (1932) ; Succession of Wiemann, 106 La. 387,
30 So. 893 (1901) ; Succession of Thibodeaux, 38 La. Ann. 716 (1886) ; Succes-
sion of Powell, 38 La. Ann. 181 (1886) ; Note, 27 TUL. L. REV. 134 (1952). La.
Acts 1906, No. 109, prevented the heirs from taking "full and complete posses-
sion" until they had paid the Louisiana inheritance tax and been judicially sent
into possession. See Succession of Blumberg, 148 La. 1030, 88 So. 297 (1921)
Comment, 22 TUL. L. REV. 635 (1948).
483. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3361-3392 (1960).
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The use of a judgment of possession is not, historically, a
violation of the civilian concept of universal succession. In the
Roman law and in the Spanish law the heir was required to ac-
cept the succession judicially.48 4 Yet, a judicial sending into pos-
session conflicts inherently with the concept of universal succes-
sion. The French doctrine of le mort saisit le vif removes this
difficulty. Louisiana, impelled by its history, confuses the mat-
ter by providing for universal succession,48 5 for the application
of the doctrine of le mort saisit le vif,4 6 for a judicial sending
into possession, 4 7 and for the broad use of a judicially regulated
administration. 48 The different elements could be brought into
rough harmony by adoption of the following principles: the
heir receives ownership at the moment of death,48 9 but he does
not receive title until he is judicially placed in possession;490
if the succession is administered, the succession representative
has possession 49' and the capacity to alienate,492 but ownership
is in the heir. 49
3
Although the judgment sending the heir into possession was
used under the Civil Code of 1808, it was removed from Lou-
isiana law by the adoption of the concept of le mort saisit le vif
in the Civil Code of 1825.494 Sixty years after the judgment
sending the heirs into possession was removed from Louisiana
law it was revived by judicial decision. 495 Adjustments were
made in the Civil Code of 1825 to meet conditions caused by the
entry of Americans into Louisiana. Yet, at the same time, an
adjustment was made to satisfy the desire to be free from legal
restraint in the adoption of the doctrine of le mort saisit le vif.
Conflicting forces brought inconsistent results. After the Civil
Code of 1825 had been adopted and after the Reconstruction era
had passed, the judicial sending of the heirs into possession was
revived because its use was desirable in a land of "strangers" in
which land was bought and sold as a commodity.
484. See Rheinstein, European Methods for the Liquidation of Debts of De-
ceased Persons, 20 IowA L. REV. 431 (1935).
485. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 943 (1870).
486. See id. art. 940.
487. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3061, 3371, 3381 (1960); LA.
R.S. 47:2401-2423 (1950) (especially 47:2413). See also note 482 supra.
488. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3081-3395 (1960).
489. See id. art. 940.
490. See id. art. 3062; Succession of Crouzeilles, 106 La. 442, 31 So. 64
(1901) ; Note, 27 TUL. L. REV. 134 (1952).
491. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3211 (1960).
492. See id. arts. 3261-3285.
493. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 940 (1870).
494. See La. Civil Code art. 934 (1825).
495. See note 482 supra.
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The Territory of Orleans and the succeeding State of Louisi-
ana did not adopt its rules concerning executors and adminis-
trators as a result of force externally applied. Within, the
American and Latin cultures for years existed on equal levels,
each participating almost equally in the social and political life
of the state. Thus, if the matter is viewed superficially, an
equal chance appears to have existed that Anglo-American or
civilian rules would have been adopted. However, in 1808, the
migration of Americans into Louisiana had scarcely begun. The
members of the Latin element of society were numerically pre-
dominant. To prevent the incurring of the permanent animos-
ity of the Latins, the Americans consented in 1808 to the adop-
tion of a code civilian in concept and content. Because laws re-
main in effect until they are changed, the selection of Anglo-
American and civilian rules on an equal basis was impaired.
Many Americans and Latins in the early years of the state
favored the civil law because of their sympathy with French
Revolutionary principles or because of their feeling that justice
required that the civil law be retained. Others struggled to
establish their respective laws out of feelings of nationalistic
loyalty. A tendency developed to adopt the Anglo-American law
in Louisiana to establish uniformity in the laws of the American
states. A desire to imitate the other states of the South tended
to cause the Anglo-American law to be adopted, especially in the
years following Reconstruction. Although after 1900 a move-
ment, originating in surviving French nationalism and in a ro-
mantic devotion to Louisiana history, developed to purify the
Louisiana law by removing Anglo-American provisions, the law
of executors and administrators was little affected by this move-
ment. Rather, the Anglo-American law was more fully accepted.
The Anglo-American law of executors and administrators was
better adjusted to a commercial society, in most respects, than
the civil law as it was stated in the Louisiana and French Codes
and in the French commentators.
In 1808, the year in which the Digest was adopted, strong
commercial tendencies were present in the Territory of Orleans
(Louisiana). Before the Civil War Louisiana society had be-
come basically commercial. The Digest was not in keeping with
commercial conditions existing in 1808. The Louisiana law of
executors and administrators has constantly been changed to
adjust it to the world of 1808 and to the more intricate com-
mercial world that came into existence after that year. In most
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cases, in choosing between civilian and Anglo-American rules,
Louisiana has selected the rule more in keeping with a commer-
cial society.
The private feudal attitudes of the planter gradually disap-
peared. Intellectual adherence to the principles of the French
Revolution caused a weakening of the planter's feudal attitudes.
These attitudes were further weakened by the entry of Anglo-
American immigrants of lower and middle class and commercial
upper class backgrounds into the planter class. The acquisition
of plantation property by northern capitalists in the Recon-
strution era forced the planters to become even more commer-
cial in point of view than they had earlier been. Finally, the
planters were destroyed as a class by the gradual and extensive
seizure of plantation property by the New Orleans merchants.
The lower classes, influenced by the principles of Jacksonian
Democracy, brought about the drafting of the Constitution of
1845. They controlled the Constitutional Convention of 1864
and again became quite influential through the Populist move-
ment in the 1890's. However, they did not control the political
structure of the state fully until the inauguration of Huey Long
as governor. The assassination of Long left the state in the
hands of his subordinates, who failed to understand the social
implications of his proposals. The increased prosperity of the
lower classes brought about a weakening of their traditional-
desires for agrarian legislation and freedom from the interfer-
ence of creditors.
In 1803 there was in the present State of Louisiana no fron-
tier, in the sense of a decisive boundary dividing the occupied
territory from the wilderness. However, in all parts of the pres-
ent state, especially in the north, large islands of unoccupied
land were to be found. Most of the inhabited regions of the state
lay only a few miles from the wilderness that was within. The
Louisianians, living near the wilderness, resented legal re-
straint. Although much of the wilderness became settled, the
resentment of legal restraint did not vanish. It continued to
find expression, in the law of executors and administrators, in
the concept of unconditional acceptance.
The Louisiana law of executors and administrators of the
present day represents a partial grafting of Anglo-American
rules and principles upon the civil law variously urged and re-
sisted, defeated and accomplished by a population of different
attitudes, origins, and ways of life.
19631
